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Articles
The Procedural Annihilation of
Structural Rights
STEVEN

G. GEY*

For several years, the Supreme Court has been systematically erecting obstacles to the
litigation of constitutional claims in federal court. Although this trend toward limiting
federal court authority affects all types of constitutional claims, including those
involving traditionalindividual constitutional rights, the most serious effect is on what
can be called "structural rights." The term "structuralrights" describes constitutional
provisions that are designed to protect the basic nature of democratic government.
These provisions constrain the power of the elected branches of government, preserve
citizen autonomy, and otherwise ensure that political winners in the democraticprocess
do not use their power in ways that undermine the democratic structure of government
in the long term. The negative effects on structural rights of the Court's recent
limitationson judicial authority are important because the usual justification the Court
gives for these limitations involves the need for judicial restraint and deference to the
elected branches of government. This is essentially a claim that the exercise of judicial
authority in these circumstances is antidemocratic. The central thesis of this Article is
that judicial restraint in the face of structural rights claims has exactly the opposite
characteristicbecause in a case raisingstructural rights claims the current government
is disempowered from doing certain things precisely to preserve the democratic
structure of government. Thus, the Article concludes somewhat paradoxically that
courts must be given the authority to enforce structural rights against the violations of
those rights by the elected branches not in spite of democracy, but ratherbecause of it.

* David and Deborah Fonvielle and Donald and Janet Hinkle Professor of Law, Florida State
University.
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INTRODUCTION

In Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc.,' the Supreme
Court limited the ability of taxpayers to challenge government programs
financing religious enterprises in violation of the Establishment Clause.
On the surface this decision is neither surprising nor unusual. In recent
years the Supreme Court has become much more reluctant to entertain
challenges to Establishment Clause violations, even when the plaintiff's
claims involve classic violations such as government financing of religious
enterprises' or public school religious exercises. Indeed, since the end of

1. 551

U.S. 587. 597 (2oo7) (plurality opinion).

See id.; Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464. 479-80 (1982) (refusing to recognize a taxpayer's standing to challenge the transfer of
government property to a religious organization).
3. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1,5 (2004) (rejecting on standing
grounds a father's Establishment Clause claim against the use of the phrase "under God" in routine
2.
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the Warren Court, the entire concept of taxpayer standing has been
reduced to little more than a constitutional curio, which has little
practical effect in the real world.4
If viewed narrowly as a case dealing with an anachronistic artifact of
the Warren Court's liberal Establishment Clause jurisprudence, Hein has
little significance beyond its holding. In fact, however, Hein is part of a
much larger pattern of procedural retrenchment by the Supreme Court
in cases involving certain kinds of constitutional violations. This pattern
of procedural retrenchment has made it much more difficult-and often
impossible-to hold the government accountable for violating its
constitutional obligations. The pattern began developing during the
Burger Court era and has continued through the Rehnquist and now the
Roberts Courts.5 The Court's procedural retrenchment has taken many
forms, including restrictions on constitutional standing,6 the expansion of
state immunities under the Eleventh Amendment,7' the narrowing of
judicial authority to issue and maintain injunctions,8 and the refusal to
infer remedial authority to enforce statutes and constitutional
provisions.9
The theme uniting these disparate phenomena can be summarized
by the recently popularized term "judicial minimalism.', 0 That is, the
notion that the Court should refrain whenever possible from rendering
substantive decisions that legally restrict the actions of the political
branches of government." There are various justifications for this
approach, most of which have to do with the perception that courts
recitations of the Pledge of Allegiance in his daughter's public school classroom).
4. See infra notes lo8-17 and accompanying text.
5. The Burger Court produced Valley Forge, 454 U.S. 464, and the Rehnquist Court generated
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), decisions that encapsulate the narrow standing
doctrine that eventually resulted in the Roberts Court's decision in Hein.
6. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 56o-6i (describing the narrow constitutional requirements for
standing).
7. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 57-73 (1996) (reaffirming traditional rules
regarding the Eleventh Amendment immunity of states, and holding that Congress cannot override
that immunity in a statute enacted under the Commerce Clause).
8. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 384 (1992) (lowering the
requirement for institutions such as jails to avoid judicial oversight by allowing courts to modify
existing structural injunctions upon a simple showing that enforcing the injunction has become
"substantially more onerous" or "unworkable because of unforeseen obstacles").
9. See infra notes 177-216 and accompanying text.
io. One of the principal proponents of judicial minimalism has been Cass Sunstein. See generally
CAsS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME CoURT (1999); Cass R.
Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 Micai. L. REV. 353 (2oo6); Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court,
'995 Term-Foreword:Leaving Things Undecided, xo HARv. L. REV. 4 (1996) (describing the theory
of "decisional minimalism"). Professor Sunstein's version of judicial minimalism generally asserts that
courts should take an incremental approach to adjudicating cases, render decisions that defer to and
show extreme respect for the elected branches of government, and display a heightened sensitivity to
social and political traditions.
II. See supra note 1o.
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should be only secondary policy actors in the American constitutional
system, deferring whenever possible to the decisions of the political
branches rather than providing legal or constitutional resolutions of
contentious issues.
The premise of this Article is that the Court's recent procedural
retrenchment has substantive implications that the Court's own
proponents of judicial minimalism do not acknowledge. Specifically, the
recent expansion of jurisdictional and remedial limitations on the courts'
authority to enforce the Constitution has the effect of eradicating entire
categories of what can be termed "structural rights." Structural rights
include constitutional provisions that structure the government's
interaction with its citizens and limit the power of government in order to
prevent governmental overreaching and ensure over the long term the
preservation of popular consent to the exercise of political power. These
structural rights inhere in the very nature of citizenship in a democracy,
and are therefore possessed by every citizen in the country.
The notion that structural rights are a universal aspect of citizenship
leads to the conclusion that the government can violate a citizen's rights
even when the citizen is not individually targeted by the government
action in question. Violations of structural rights can therefore occur in
various different contexts, including the executive branch's systematic
financing of religious enterprises in Hein, government programs
collecting information on political dissidents,'4 comprehensive programs
of warrantless searches at issue in recent anti-terrorism litigation, 5 voting
rights violations,16 and violations of relatively mundane constitutional
provisions intended to ensure governmental independence and the

This argument appears in various guises. See supra note to (judicial minimalism); RAOUL
(1977) (arguing that society should avoid at all costs "government
by judiciary"); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW (2005) (popular constitutionalism); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUION AWAY FROM
THE COURTS (2ooo) (claiming that the Constitution should be "taken away from the courts," in favor of
populist determinations of constitutional meaning). Although the details of the arguments and the
ideological preferences of the authors vary, the authors share the sense that granting to the courts
exclusive authority over certain constitutional matters is inherently undemocratic and contrary to the
long-term interests of the nation. This increasingly common perception is directly challenged in this
Article.
13. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 597 (2007) (plurality opinion)
(limiting taxpayer standing to challenge Establishment Clause violations by the executive branch).
14. See Laird v. Tatum. 4o8 U.S. i, 3 (1972) (denying standing to plaintiffs challenging the United
States Army's surveillance and collection of information on domestic political protesters).
15. See, e.g., USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 1o7-56, 115 Stat. 272, 278-96 (2001) (codified in
scattered sections of 8, 12, 18, 21, 22, 28, 31, 47, and 5o U.S.C) (authorizing the government to engage
in various types of searches without going through the ordinary channels necessary to obtain judicial
warrants).
16. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952,957-58 (1996) (holding that individuals who live within a state,
but outside an illegally gerrymandered district within that state, lack standing to challenge the
gerrymander).
12.

BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY
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dissemination of public information about the government's activities."
When the government violates structural rights in these ways, it changes
the nature of the government and alters the basic structure of authority
that defines a constitutional democracy. Likewise, when the Court limits
judicial power to consider an individual citizen's challenge to the
government's violations of structural rights, the Court effectively
eradicates the structural limitations on the government's power and thus
fundamentally, but surreptitiously, restructures the constitutional
landscape.
This Article will address the effect the Court's recent procedural
retrenchment has had on the enforcement of structural rights. The first
Part will address the theory of structural rights generally and discuss
their role in defining the nature of the American constitutional
democracy. The second Part will catalog the various ways in which the
Court has limited constitutional remedies during the last twenty years,
with a special focus on the extent to which these limitations have affected
structural rights. The third Part will discuss and respond to the Court's
justifications for limiting constitutional remedies in the context of claims
regarding structural rights. In the end, the Court's basic justification for
limiting redress of structural rights violations is that these rights all
amount to political questions.' 8 Based on this assumption, the Court
eschews any judicial oversight and permits dominant political majorities
to define the limits of their own power in ways that are directly contrary
to the spirit of the American Constitution. The Article concludes by
questioning both the Court's justifications and the consequences of
renouncing the judicial role in enforcing structural rights.

I.

INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, STRUCTURAL RIGHTS, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES

Constitutional rights protect citizens from their government in
various ways. The most obvious way is by protecting against unwarranted
government action directed at one or more specific individuals." These
individual rights are no doubt important because they protect a zone of
individual autonomy for citizens. A zone of individual autonomy is
17. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 178 (1974) (denying standing to plaintiffs
seeking to challenge under the Statement and Account Clause Congress's refusal to publish
information about the CIA's top-secret "black budget").
18. See id. at 179 ("In a very real sense, the absence of any particular individual or class to litigate
these claims gives support to the argument that the subject matter is committed to the surveillance of
Congress, and ultimately to the political process.").
'9. As used in this Article, the term "individual" includes both individuals and gatherings or
groups of individuals in the private sector. Thus, the term encompasses political parties, clubs, social
groups, and so forth. One of the key distinctions between the terms "individual rights" and "structural
rights" is that when the government violates individual rights it targets only a subset of society,
whereas when the government violates structural rights it undermines the rights shared by all citizens.
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necessary to cultivate the resilient and independent persona of
citizenship that is required for a proper democracy to flourish. A society
in which individuals are constantly worried about arbitrary (or worse,
perniciously targeted) government action against themselves and their
property will never benefit from the ongoing, open, and direct critiques
of the public order that are the lifeblood of a true democracy. A
government that can, without fear of consequences, target individuals for
what they say or do-or for that matter can, without fear of
consequences, harm individuals for no reason at all-is not a government
that accurately can be described as operating under the control of its
citizens.
While the benefits that individual rights provide to both government
and citizens are obvious, democratic governance can also be undermined
by government action that does not immediately single out and harm
specific individuals. Thus, another category of rights comes into play
when it is necessary to protect against unconstitutional government
conduct in order to preserve the very structure of democratic
government. This is the category of rights that I will refer to as
"structural rights." In some ways the category of structural rights is even
more important to the preservation of constitutional democracy than the
more familiar category of individual rights. Individual rights protect
against isolated acts of government misconduct; structural rights protect
against systematic and continuing government misconduct. Individual
rights involve an abuse of power; structural rights involve an illegal
aggrandizement of power. If we countenance government misconduct
within the category of individual rights, then isolated injustice occurs, but
this sort of violation usually does very little permanent damage to the
social or political structure. If we countenance government misconduct
within the category of structural rights, however, then the entire
structure of government is threatened in a way that could potentially
exterminate all rights-individual as well as structural.
A.

THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF INDIVIDUAL AND STRUCTURAL RIGHTS

At the highest level of abstraction, individual rights and structural
rights are closely related. After all, all rights are intended to restrict the
government to certain areas of collective action and thereby preserve
other areas in which individuals may act without government regulation,
supervision, or intervention in their activities or affairs. Although
individual and structural rights are related, however, they are manifested
in different ways.
Many individual and structural rights relate explicitly to political
matters and democratic governance. Examples include First Amendment
rights relating to political speech, voting rights, and equal protection
rights to participate in government activities. It is easy to see how these

November 2009]

ANNIHILATION OF STRUCTURAL RIGHTS

7

matters could take the form of individual rights claims. The First
Amendment right to political speech, for example, could be violated
when the government specifically targets a particular political dissenter.20
Voting rights violations could take the form of government actions
denying individual voters the right to exercise the franchise." Equal
protection could be violated by government actions prohibiting
particular individuals from participating in the routine activities of
government."
On the other hand, it is also easy to see how each of these matters
could take the form of structural rights violations. Structural rights
violations of the First Amendment could occur, for example, when the
government imposes loyalty oaths for voting or government
employment." Structural voting rights violations could occur whenever
the government gerrymanders entire voting districts." Structural equal
protection violations could occur when an entire group of people is
prohibited altogether from participating in the political process."
To further complicate matters, structural rights violations often will
involve a simultaneous violation of individual rights. A First Amendment
case involving the imposition of loyalty oaths will involve a structural
rights violation since the oaths are intended to reconfigure the political
system in a way that favors the current government. As soon as someone
refuses to take the loyalty oath, however, an individual rights violation
will also occur. Likewise, a gerrymandering case will involve structural
rights violations because the current government is attempting to distort
the political system in order to reinforce and perpetuate its power, but
the same action will also violate the individual rights of all voters who
have been manipulated either into or out of the district. The key fact
here is simply that individuated harm of the sort usually found in private
civil litigation is not the only kind of harm that should be recognized

20. See, e.g., Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216-17 (1919) (affirming the ten-year prison
sentence of a presidential candidate for making an antiwar speech).
21. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 360 (1972) (holding unconstitutional a state law
establishing as a prerequisite to voting that individuals must reside within the state for a year and
within the county for three months).
22. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986) (prohibiting prosecutors from using
peremptory challenges to bar individuals from serving on juries because of their race).
23. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 6o9-so (1967) (holding unconstitutional
New York statutes requiring state employees to sign loyalty oaths certifying that they do not support
or teach the violent overthrow of the government).
24. See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 143 (1986) (holding that political gerrymandering
that systematically dilutes the voting strength of classes of voters is potentially a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause).
25. See Terry v. Adams. 345 U.S. 461, 484 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664-66 (944);
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927). Collectively known as the "White Primary Cases," these
three cases held that state laws prohibiting racial minorities from voting in political parties' all-white
primaries violate the Equal Protection Clause.

8

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 6 1: 1

under the Constitution. In the case of a structural rights violation,
everyone in society has had their rights violated-even though they may
not be able to show precise and individualized damage as a result of the
violation.
In addition to rights that are directly related to political
participation and the political process, for several decades the courts
have recognized a multitude of rights that relate to more personal
matters of a nonpolitical nature. Again, many of these can be
characterized both as individual and structural rights. The Texas state
statute denying access to abortion that was challenged in Roe v. Wade, 6
for example, was a matter of individual rights in the sense that it
prevented Norma McCorvey from obtaining an abortion, but the case
was also a matter of structural rights in the sense that it was used by the
Court to articulate a constitutional structure in which the state and
federal governments were not allowed to strip from all women the right
to make their own reproductive choices. In other words, Roe v. Wade
represents a structural rights decision in the sense that it redefined the
constitutional universe in a way that redrew the lines between
government regulation and unfettered private decision-making regarding
matters of reproduction and childbirth.
Another decision that illustrates the relationship between individual
and structural rights arose out of the privacy doctrine that generated Roe
v. Wade." When the Court recognized a constitutional privacy right to
sexual freedom in Lawrence v. Texas," the Court not only dismissed
criminal charges against the two petitioners in the case, it also articulated
a broad series of structural restrictions on the extent to which the
government could intrude upon individual decisions pertaining to sex
and sexuality."
Cases such as Roe v. Wade and Lawrence v. Texas illustrate the
breadth of the concept of structural rights. Recall that at the beginning of
this Part the concept of structural rights was defined as rights that come
into play when it is necessary to protect against unconstitutional
government conduct in order to preserve the very structure of

26. 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973) (striking down Texas abortion statute as a violation of the federal
constitutional right of privacy).
27. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (establishing a "zone of privacy created
by several fundamental constitutional guarantees").
28. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (striking down Texas sodomy statute as a violation of the federal
constitutional right of privacy).
29. Id. at 567. The Court asserted a Millian liberty principle as the overriding theme of its
decision. After noting that Texas was attempting to regulate "a personal relationship that, whether or
not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being
punished as criminals," the Court went on to conclude, "This, as a general rule, should counsel against
attempts by the State, or a court, to define the meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries
absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects." Id.
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democratic government. At first glance, this definition would only
encompass narrow political rights such as those protected in the Court's
First Amendment political speech cases. This narrow interpretation
would also exclude from the concept of structural rights any
constitutional criminal prozedure protections, privacy rights, or
separation of powers provisions.
This narrow interpretation of the concept of structural rights,
however, focuses on a far too narrow conception of what democratic
theory requires. Under any conception of democratic theory, the sine qua
non is the notion that the citizen is independent from-indeed, superior
to-that citizen's government. The essential condition of democratic
government is that it depends on the consent of the governed, and that
consent in turn depends on the ability of those who make up the
governed to develop their own perspectives on the world free of coercion
and governmental duress, so that they may critique the government's
performance and, if that performance is unsatisfactory, reject the
government in favor of another. Thus, structural rights would encompass
not only the right to read and speak about explicitly political matters, but
also (as Alexander Meiklejohn eventually concluded in his landmark
early First Amendment books and articles3 0) would protect expression
concerning any other subject that contributes to the development of the
human psyche. As Meiklejohn concluded in the First Amendment
context, a person's political views stem from more than just that person's
musings on subjects that are explicitly political." Rather, a person's
politics stem from that person's full persona. Political views are a product
of the person taken as a whole, and include not just the political views of
the person, but also the person's participation in religious, personal,
sexual, and cultural activities, as well as even those casual matters that
seem far removed from the affairs of state, ideology, and public policy.
Structural rights are the mechanism that democratic constitutions employ
to prevent the government from systematically straying into these aspects
of the citizens' autonomy. This is not because of any need to respect the
inherent or natural rights of individuals, as is commonly argued in
defense of individual rights.32 Rather, structural rights exist as much to
protect the government (at least a particular type of government) and its
30. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITs RELATION TOSELF-GOVERNMENT 94 (2d ed.
2oo2) (arguing that public policy speech receives priority under the First Amendment); Alexander

Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Cr. REV. 245, 255-57 (broadening the
concept of public-policy speech to include expression that contributes to the development of political
beliefs and values).
31. See supra note 30.
32. There are, of course, multiple different versions of individual rights theory along all points of
the political continuum. Compare ROBERT NozicK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974) (articulating a
theory of human rights that leads to a market-oriented, minimalist state), with JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY

oF JUsTICE (197T) (describing a social-democratic theory of natural and individual rights).

1o0
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citizens en masse as to preserve the rights of the government's citizens
individually. In short, structural rights exist in order to preserve the
citizen's political independence which in turn preserves the government's
democratic legitimacy.

B.

THE CONCEPT OF STRUCTURAL RIGHTS AS APPLIED TO PARTICULAR
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

The approach advanced here views the concept of structural rights
as primarily about protecting a government's democratic legitimacy by
preventing that government from intruding into its citizens' personal and
political autonomy. This approach significantly broadens the range of
issues covered by the concept. Some constitutional protections, such as
those embodied in the First Amendment, are easy to construe as
structural rights. Thus, the concept of structural rights undoubtedly
encompasses almost every aspect of the First Amendment, including
both political and nonpolitical speech. If the individual rights conception
of the First Amendment protects the right of speakers to have their say,
the structural rights conception of the First Amendment protects the
right of listeners to hear all available points of view on every subject.
Any government effort to suppress the dissemination of this information
is by definition an infringement of the citizen's right to inform him- or
herself as to whether the government is doing its job. It is impossible to
conceive of a vibrant democracy operating without open discussion of
every imaginable topic-even if the government does not like the
direction of the discussion, and even if the government's efforts
effectively suppress the discussion without producing a single identifiable
speaker as an individual rights "victim" of official censorship. The
structural rights perspective does a much better job of explaining the
expansive scope and speech-protectiveness of modern First Amendment
jurisprudence than the individual rights justifications that the Court
continues to rely on in its opinions.33
The conception of structural rights also explains the existence and
function of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment far better
than an individual rights analysis. Under a structural rights conception,
the Establishment Clause mandates that the government must take an
agnostic approach to issues relating to religion or religious faith. This
mandate exists not because of any particular constitutional attitude
toward religion as a subject, but rather for two reasons relating to the
democratic political structure of the country. The first reason is a formal

33. For a classic statement of the individual rights conception of the First Amendment, see Justice
Harlan's majority opinion in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971), much of which revolves
around the central proposition that "the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the
individual."

November

2009]

ANNIHILATION OF STRUCTURAL RIGHTS

I1I

recognition of the dangers religion poses to democratic political order.
These dangers are both historical" and conceptual." The second reason
the Establishment Clause mandate exists is to provide a means of
protecting an important aspect of the process by which a person develops
deep-seated values that combine to form a comprehensive worldview,
which in turn ultimately will inform that person's political attitudes and
actions. By preventing religious organizations from using the government
to imbue the public sphere (and in particular the public schools) with
their theological views, the government has thereby freed citizens to
develop their own personal perspective on the world without having to
contend with an official morality with which they may deeply disagree.
Viewed from this perspective, the Establishment Clause is not a sorethumb provision within the First Amendment, but rather exemplifies the
thrust of all of the First Amendment's provisions: citizens should be
allowed to develop their sensibilities and attitudes toward life and
politics free of government coercion or duress. In practice, therefore, any
action by the government to embrace, advance, or endorse a particular
religion or religion in general violates the constitutional mandate against
the politicization of religion in a way that undermines the central
structural protection of a private realm relating to the development of
individual beliefs, values, and perspectives.
Other provisions of the Bill of Rights function as structural rights in
somewhat different ways than the First Amendment. The criminal
procedure provisions of the Bill of Rights-contained in the Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Amendments -provide the crucial structural function of
limiting the government's ability to use physical force as a means of
exerting its dominance over society. The structural rights aspects of the
Constitution's criminal procedure provisions serve both expressive and
corporeal functions. The expressive function is simply to communicate to
the government, the government's police officers, and individual citizens
that there are strict limits to the government's ability to employ the
truncheon in a democratic society. If this message is communicated
34. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. Cm. L. REV. 195. 197 (1992)
("Secular governance of public affairs is simply an entailment of the settlement by the Establishment
Clause of the war of all sects against all.").
35. The conceptual problems have to do with two complementary phenomena. The first is the
inability of any pluralistic collective body to develop the ability to comprehend, understand, or come
to terms with the divine in either its general or specific aspects. The second is the tyrannical potential
of having any subset of a pluralistic collective body impose on the entire body the subset's peculiar
notions of the divine and its various mandates. This, at least, was James Madison's view. See James
Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments 8 (1785), as reprinted in
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. i, app. at 64-72 (947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) ("What influence in
fact have ecclesiastical establishments had on Civil Society? In some instances they have been seen to
erect a spiritual tyranny on the ruins of Civil authority; in many instances they have been seen
upholding the thrones of political tyranny; in no instance have they been seen the guardians of the
liberties of the people.").
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clearly enough and enforced with sufficient rigor, government officials
(including police officers) should eventually internalize this message and
begin to constrain their own behavior. There is a clear relationship
between the expressive function of the criminal procedure provisions and
the objectives of the structural rights conception of the Constitution. If a
democratic government is beholden to its citizens, then government
officials must always remain modest about their own power and the
source of that power. Conversely, citizens are entitled to be somewhat
haughty about their own relationships with the government. It is
important for government officials-and especially police officials-to be
reminded occasionally that they are subordinate to the citizens. As
Justice Brennan once noted, "The freedom of individuals verbally to
oppose or challenge police action without thereby risking arrest is one of
the principal characteristics by which we distinguish a free nation from a

police state."36
The corporeal function of the criminal procedure provisions is
simply to limit the physical power of the state over its citizens. By
limiting the ability of the state to put people in jail without adequate
proof of guilt, or to use the police to illegally arrest or harass individual
citizens, the Constitution greatly constrains the state's ability to enforce
its will on recalcitrant citizens. This function is related to the structural
objectives of democratic constitutionalism in two ways. First, it prevents
the government from using its public safety authority for political means.
One of the most time-honored methods of extending one faction's
political control is to arrest and imprison that faction's political
opponents." Second, it reinforces the communicative function of
constitutional criminal procedure provisions by providing a concrete
mechanism for enforcing the limits imposed on government when the
government exceeds the bounds of its constitutional authority.
When reduced to essentials, the gist of all these provisions is that
although the police are employed to maintain security and enforce the
law, they still work for the citizens, and should expect to be held
accountable whenever they overstep their authority. As with the First
Amendment, many of these same functions can also be accomplished
through the individual rights aspects of the criminal procedure
provisions. On the other hand, the requirement of governmental

36. Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 46243 (1987).
37. Perhaps the most notorious example of this phenomenon in the United States is the use by
President Adams's Federalist Administration of the Alien and Sedition Acts to imprison the
Administration's Jeffersonian opponents. See generally N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273-76
(1964). Although its constitutionality was never tested in court, the Act is now widely viewed as having
been unconstitutional. See id. at 276. The Act expired soon after Jefferson became President in 1801,
and President Jefferson pardoned those who had been convicted under the Acts and remitted their
fines. See id.
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accountability that is at the heart of the structural rights interpretation
has broader ramifications than simply allowing for individual citizen
lawsuits against police officers who have harmed them. The
accountability required under the structural rights concept also dictates
that broad-scale government infringements into individual privacy
should be subject to redress without regard to whether individual victims
of those infringements can be found. Also, in the ongoing debate about
the relative balance between security and liberty, the structural approach
mandates that the balance should never be struck in favor of security if
such a balance would significantly inhibit the ability of citizens to check
the government and challenge its direction. Thus, recent activities such as
the widespread surreptitious surveillance of political groups and
individuals,' 8 or the comprehensive wiretapping of private telephone calls
without any suspicion of criminal behavior, 39 are inherently suspect.
Other aspects of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment
also serve the structural function of maintaining the proper relationship
between the government and its citizens. Many of these are fairly
obvious. For example, the implicit right of privacy that the Court derived
from various constitutional amendments40 and the Due Process Clause 4'
operates in much the same way as the nonpolitical speech protections of
the First Amendment in maintaining a buffer between individual citizens
and the potential for government coercion. By the same token, the Equal
Protection Clause also imposes on the government strictures that limit
the government's ability to permanently ostracize entire sectors of
society.42 The concept of democracy that underlies the theory of
38. For one account of past FBI political surveillance, see Athan G. Theoharis. FBI Surveillance:
Past and Present, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 883 (1984). In more recent times, the Attorney General has
issued guidelines indicating that the government has the right to conduct surveillance and investigation
of political groups without any indication that the groups have engaged in criminal activity. See THE
ArrORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES FOR FBI NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS AND FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION 3 (2oo3), availableat http://www.fas.orglirp/agency/doj/fbilnsiguidelines.pdf.
39. For two cases that have been filed recently to challenge this type of illegal government
behavior, see Jewel v. National Security Agency, No. o8-cv-4373-VRW (N.D. Cal. filed Sept. 18, 2008),
and Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006). The central allegation in each of
these cases is that the National Security Agency collaborated with AT&T to intercept the telephone
and e-mail messages of millions of Americans without judicial warrants or oversight. and with no prior
indication of criminal behavior by the authors of the messages. See Complaint at 2, 7-15, Jewel, No. o8cv-4373-VRW, available at http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/jewel/jewel.complaint.pdf; Amended
Complaint at 2-3,7-13, Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (No. C-o6-o672-JCS), availableat http://www.eff.org/
files/filenode/att/attcomplaint amended.pdf.
40. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (declaring that the "penumbras, formed
by emanations" of various constitutional amendments create "zones of privacy" that are largely
immune from government regulation).
41. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) (locating in the Due
Process Clause the constitutional protection of "a person's most basic decisions about family and
parenthood").
42. See supra note 25, discussing the "White Primary Cases," in which the Court prohibited
southern states from ostracizing African American citizens by denying them permission to vote in
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structural rights is predicated on the notion that democracy is not a
snapshot of reality at any given point in time, but rather a process that is
intended to endure (if the project is successful) over centuries. The longterm focus of the democratic political structure dictates that the political
or racial majority today may not necessarily be the political or racial
majority fifty years from now. The political structure must take that fact
into account by protecting political minorities today so that they have the
opportunity to increase their numbers, muster support, and work to take
power in the indefinite future. The Equal Protection Clause is a crucial
structural component of the Constitution's recognition of this structural
reality.
Although subdividing rights into individual and structural categories
may be somewhat unusual, the general concept should not be
controversial. What may be slightly more controversial is that the
concept of structural rights includes constitutional provisions that are not
usually categorized as rights at all. These would include any provision
dealing with the explicit allocation of powers within the government, any
provision governing the qualifications of those holding political office in
any branch of government, and any provision specifically detailing the
functions and responsibilities of the various branches and departments of
the federal government. The consequence of treating these aspects of the
Constitution as structural rights would be to provide individual citizens
with a direct interest in remedying violations of those provisions.
The controversial nature of providing individual redress for
structural rights claims, such as separation of powers violations, will be
addressed at length in Part I, infra. For now, however, it is worth noting
that treating as structural rights non-individualized constitutional claims
such as those involving the separation of powers is not at all radical once
we accept the premises that (i) the Constitution is primarily a document
that is designed to preserve over the long term a basic form of
democratic government; (2) democratic government requires that elected
officials be held in check and that the government run by those officials
must always be beholden to the citizenry; and (3) in the absence of some
external mechanism for enforcing constitutional restrictions on the
power of public officials, those officials are naturally inclined to amass
power and undermine the influence of those in society that the officials
consider political or cultural opponents. Once these (presumably
uncontroversial) premises are accepted, and the acceptance of these
abstract premises is accompanied by a concrete commitment to enforce
these basic precepts of democratic government, then it is impossible to
avoid ascribing the status of structural rights to provisions that are
usually treated as little more than unenforceable housekeeping

politically crucial party primaries.
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measures. After all, if the bona fides of a democratic government depend
on the nature of that government, and if the rightful proprietors of a
democratic government are the citizens of that government, then
refusing to grant those citizens an individual interest in enforcing the
limitations imposed by the government's founding document robs those
citizens of the very control that the founding document was drafted to
guarantee.
The basic concept of democratic governance is the theme that unites
the structural functions of the Bill of Rights and the purely structural
provisions scattered throughout the main body of the Constitution. Most
of the structural rights in the latter category never get litigated, or get
litigated only to the point at which (because of the various procedural
limitations discussed in Part II, infra) the Court dismisses the complaint
on procedural grounds.43 Many plaintiffs attempt to litigate structural
rights within the first category, only to be thwarted by the same
procedural limitations, limitations whose application plaintiffs often
invite by attempting to shoehorn their lawsuits into the individual rights
paradigm." The minor premise of this Article is that the structural rights
within the Constitution should be enforceable as such by citizens,
without regard to whether the particular provision is phrased in terms of
individual rights, and also without regard to whether the person raising
the claim in court has an individualized injury analogous to the injuries
that arise in civil litigation. The major premise of this Article is that
virtually everything the Court has done in the last two decades with
regard to limiting access to judicial relief in constitutional law litigation
has had a disproportionate effect on claims of a structural rights variety.
Thus, it could be said that one of the Court's major objectives during the
last decade is to forestall the most crucial type of constitutional litigation:
litigation intended to keep the government within its proper parameters
to preserve the basic framework of democratic governance. The details
of this claim will be addressed after a brief consideration of the
relationship between the concept of structural rights and other structural
interpretations of the Constitution.
C.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STRUCTURAL RIGHTS AND OTHER
STRUCTURAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION

Structural theories have played a prominent role in constitutional
interpretation for many years. 45 Structural interpretations of the
43. The classic examples of this phenomenon are the United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166
(1974), and Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 209 (1974). decisions discussed infra
note 251-

44. The cases discussed infra notes 74-122 provide various examples of attempts to mix individual
rights, structural rights, and other constitutional claims.
45. In many ways John Marshall's opinions provide the earliest examples of a structural approach
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Constitution serve as a counterpoint to other modes of constitutional
interpretation, including those that focus on textual exegesis, original
intent, original meaning, theories of an evolving or "living" Constitution,
and theories of judicial fidelity to abstract conceptions of rights.
Although proponents of a structural interpretation vary widely in the
meanings they ascribe to particular constitutional provisions, they are
united by the objective of seeking an interpretive method that treats the
Constitution as a uniform document. Under such a method, all
constitutional provisions should be viewed as oriented toward the same
goals, and must therefore be interpreted in conjunction with one another
rather than in isolation. In this sense, the theory of structural rights is
consistent with other structural interpretations of the Constitution,
because the theory of structural rights views all constitutional provisions
as oriented toward the goal of preserving the basic conditions of
constitutional democracy over the long term. Beyond this basic
agreement about the need for an internally consistent interpretation of
the entire document, structural theories of constitutional interpretation
can differ a great deal with regard to the precise conclusions they draw
about the meaning of particular constitutional terms and indeed the basic
objectives of constitutional jurisprudence generally. A brief
consideration of two prominent structural theories of the Constitution
will illustrate this point and highlight the differences between these
theories and the theory of structural rights posited here.
The most prominent example of a structural interpretation of the
Constitution can be found in the work of Charles Black, who described
his view of the approach in his slim 1969 masterpiece Structure and
Relationship in Constitutional Law.46 Black's version of the structural
interpretation is quite similar to the interpretation that produces the
concept of structural rights. Black's approach to the Constitution
emphasizes "the method of inference from the structures and
relationships created by the constitution."47 An obvious implication of
the structural approach is that textualism simpliciter is insufficient to
answer many, if not most, important constitutional law questions. One of
Black's main targets is the tendency of commentators and courts to rely
so heavily on textualism and precedent in deriving constitutional

to constitutional interpretation, by eschewing narrow linguistic or historical approaches to determining
constitutional meaning in favor of a broad approach emphasizing the interrelationship of all
constitutional provisions, as exemplified by Marshall's insistence in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819), that the nature of the Constitution requires "that only its great outlines
should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those
objects be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves.... [W]e must never forget[] that it is a
constitution we are expounding."
46. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP INCONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969).
47. Id. at 7.
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meaning.48 Black's response to this commonplace textualism can be read
in two ways. The most obvious understanding of Black's approach
suggests that constitutional meaning must be derived from a careful
comparison of terms within the text of the Constitution-thus reading
Black not as an opponent of textualism, but rather a proponent of a sort
of super-textualism. Under the more radical interpretation of Black,
however, his approach requires those interpreting the Constitution to go
outside the text to identify the central purpose that the text is designed to
serve. Under this interpretation of Black, structuralism becomes a way of
integrating into the document extratextual sources such as constitutional
and political theory-sources that are not extraneous to the search for
constitutional meaning, but rather provide the only logical explanation
for why the various provisions included in the Constitution are there in
the first place.
To fully appreciate the link between the concept of structural rights
and the work of Professor Black, one must first dispense with a common
misconception about the nature of the main arguments in Structure and
Relationship. As Professor Michael Dorf has pointed out, Black is often
misconstrued as an interpretive holist, who was concerned primarily with
the relationship between the various textual provisions of the
Constitution.49 As Dorf notes, while this element was certainly present in
0
Structure and Relationship, it is by no means the main focus of the book.
In much of the book, Black moved outside the constitutional text to find
relevant aspects of constitutional law in other sources." In Dorf's
characterization, "[Black] infers his constitutional rule of law from what
he takes to be the most productive way of organizing relations among
constitutionally created and recognized actors, not constitutional
clauses." 52 Under this interpretation, Black's structural approach to
constitutional law is less about the text itself than it is about Black
directing "attention toward various structures and relationships created
under the Constitution to ensure that the Republic continues to
function."53
It is in this respect that the concept of structural rights melds into
Black's concept of constitutional structure and relationship. The concept
of structural rights makes certain assumptions about the nature of the
Constitution and various constitutional provisions. The broad

48. Id. at 13.
49. See Michael C. Dorf, Interpretive Holism and the Structural Method, or How Charles Black
Might Have Thought About Campaign Finance Reform and Congressional Timidity, 92 GEo. L.J. 833,
834-35 (2004).

50. Id.
51. Id. at 835-37.

Id. at 837.
53. Craig Green, Erie and Problems of ConstitutionalStructure, 96 CAL. L. REv. 66i, 685 (2oo8).
52.
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assumption is that the Constitution was intended to create a democratic
form of government that is intended to last for generations. Therefore, as
described in the previous Part, the Constitution imposes on the
government certain characteristics and limitations intended to preserve
the pivotal democratic mandate that government policy and personnel
must remain both fluid and impermanent. Thus, certain methods of
exercising power are prohibited because they tend to centralize authority
in a way that will inhibit the circulation of elites that is necessary to
preserve over the long term a true democracy.54 Likewise, "losers'
principles"-that is, principles extrapolated from the recognition that a
proper constitutional democracy must include structural protections of
political losers-are necessary to protect the ability of political losers at
one point in time to continue their efforts to muster support in the hope
of becoming political winners at some future point. The key to
interpreting the Constitution, therefore, is to keep the Court's focus on
the ultimate point of the entire endeavor, which is to preserve the
structural conditions of democracy. The Constitution is intended to
regulate and limit the exercise of governmental power in ways that deny
to the citizenry the ability to accurately assess the government's actions,
militate against the government, or seek to dismiss the current regime
from power. Any interpretation of the document that has the effect of
increasing the current regime's authority over the citizenry in these
respects is, under the structural interpretation, ipso facto invalid.
Although it does so in the work of Charles Black, the structural
interpretation of the Constitution does not always produce a theory that
is consistent with the concept of structural rights-or, for that matter,
with a robust conception of individual rights. The structuralist views of
Akhil Amar are a case in point." Like Black, much of Amar's work
regarding constitutional interpretation is oriented around an emphasis on
the interrelated structural functions of each constitutional provision."
But unlike Black, Amar's work is really more of an exercise in textualism
and historicism than in pure structuralism.s Amar focuses heavily on the
historical context of the drafting and ratification of particular
constitutional provisions in order to discern their meaning. Thus,

54. Examples of this would include government efforts to suppress political debate, ban political
parties, or rig elections by other means.
55. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998).
56. Professor Amar coined the term "intratextualism" to describe his approach. See Akhil Reed
Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REv. 747, 748 (1999). Under this approach, "the interpreter tries
to read a contested word or phrase that appears in the Constitution in light of another passage in the
Constitution featuring the same (or a very similar) word or phrase." Id.
57. Professor Amar forthrightly acknowledges this, arguing that "although some might seek to
divorce textual from structural arguments, there are sound reasons to keep them wed." Akhil Reed
Amar, Fonvard: The Document and the Doctrine, I 14 HARV. L. REV. 26, 29 (2000).
58. See id.
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although Amar accepts Justice Hugo Black's argument that the Bill of
Rights is incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore
applicable to the states, he also argues that some of the Bill of Rights are
not enforceable by individual citizens against a government: "the right
question is not whether a clause is fundamental, but whether it is truly a
private right of the citizen rather than a right of the states or the public
generally.""
Phrasing the question in this way-that is, setting citizens' rights
against the rights of states and "the public generally"-has the inevitable
effect of extracting from the Constitution basic provisions that under a
Charles Black-style structural interpretation could never be jettisoned
without doing serious damage to the most basic purposes of the
document. Thus, it is not at all surprising for one who focuses exclusively
on the text and its original historical milieu to arrive at the conclusion
that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment does not provide
a private right against governmental religious coercion, but rather
provides the states the "right" to engage in such coercion.6 It would not
be possible, on the other hand, for someone who focuses on the
structural rights conception of the Constitution to arrive at the same
conclusion. To a structural rights theorist, the Establishment Clause must
be interpreted in light of its role in protecting the democratic process,
which by its nature must remain secular. 6 ' Therefore, the Establishment
Clause should include an individual right of action against any
government-federal, state, or local-that seeks through law or the
exercise of governmental power to impose on the entire culture one
faction's religious values.
None of this is intended to suggest that either the structural rights
interpretation or Charles Black's version of the structural interpretation
are inconsistent or incompatible with the practice of using the text and
history of the Constitution as aides in the determination of constitutional
meaning. As with Charles Black's own version of the structural

59. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. I193,
1265 (1992).

6o. See AMAR, supra note 55, at 40-42 (arguing that the Establishment Clause was intended only
to prevent the federal government from interfering with state religious establishments, and should
therefore not be interpreted to provide a private constitutional right against state violations of
religious freedom).
61. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 199
(1992).

Secular governance of public affairs is simply an entailment of the settlement by the
Establishment Clause of the war of all sects against all. From the perspective of the
prepolitical war of all sects against all, the exclusion of any religion from public affairs looks
like "discrimination." But from the perspective of the settlement worked by the
Establishment Clause, it looks like proper treatment.
Id
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interpretation, the structuralist interpretation proposed here to arrive at
a theory of structural rights is consistent with an attempt to interpret the
constitutional text coherently. Both Black's view and the structural rights
theory are consistent with a sophisticated version of what Professor
Amar has called "intratextualism." 62 As Amar notes, requiring an
interpreter to view the document as a consistent and intertwined whole
not only has "a certain undeniable aesthetic attraction,"" it also prevents
"interpretive cheating,"6 4 and invites interpreters to recognize the crossillumination of noncontiguous constitutional provisions.6
All this is true, but intratextualism should be kept in its proper
interpretive place. An interpretive approach that emphasizes too
strongly the role of intratextualism will inevitably fall victim to the same
fatal flaw as other versions of textualism, in that the interpreter will dwell
so closely on the text that language, grammar, and syntax will tend to
override the more fruitful and appropriate focus on constitutional policy
and theory. The point of proper structural interpretation is not to ignore
the text; the point is simply to recognize what kind of text we are
interpreting. The Constitution is not a literary artifact; rather, it is (in
Charles Black's phrase) a "working charter of government."6 Proper
interpretations of the Constitution, therefore, must take into account not
only what kind of government that document was intended to create, but
also what interpretations of the document would make the government
work and therefore achieve the document's purposes. This is, of course,
hardly a new idea. It seems to have occurred, for example, to Chief
Justice Marshall when he pointed out in McCulloch v. Maryland that "we
must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding."67 The
mode of interpretation proposed here does not require the interpreter to
ignore the text of the Constitution; it simply requires the interpreter to
avoid reading the constitutional text in a way that would undermine the
very purposes that the document was written to achieve.
In concluding this discussion of structural theories of constitutional
interpretation and the concept of structural rights, note that the concept
of structural rights is merely a subset of the broader and more
comprehensive structural theories. Although the existence of structural
rights is important to the implementation of any serious theory of
structural interpretation, the theory of structural rights is not intended to
address constitutional provisions that serve no democracy-preserving
structural function or are intended to protect other interests. For

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

See Amar, supra note 56.
Id- at 799.
Id. at 798.
Id.
See Green, supra note 53, at 685.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,407 (1819).
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example, it is worth emphasizing once more that structural rights are
very different from (although potentially coexistent with) the category of
individual rights, which serve different functions from structural rights
and are justified on different grounds.
Assuming that structural rights exist and serve an important
function distinct from individual rights, the question addressed in this
Article is whether the Supreme Court is fundamentally misconstruing the
Constitution when it systematically denies relief for violations of
structural rights. The issue is confusing only because the categories of
structural and individual rights are not hermetically sealed. A
constitutional provision may, as a matter of constitutional theory,
provide both structural protection and individual protections." The fact
that the Court provides relief for violations of the individual-rights
aspects of a particular constitutional provision does not demonstrate that
the Court is also enforcing the structural protections of the provision.
Likewise, the protections offered to the victim of an individual rights
violation may not adequately protect the structural interests of the rest of
society.
The remainder of this Article will address the issues relating to the
enforcement of structural rights. The key point is that there are rights
throughout the Constitution that provide crucial components of the
framework that dictates the way that the government should interact
with its citizens, and violations of those provisions will not always
produce direct evidence of individual harm to a particular citizen. The
next Part will discuss the ways in which the modern Court has imposed
various procedural obstacles to the litigation of structural claims where
there is no direct evidence of individual harm. The third Part will then
discuss the possible justifications for the Court's refusal to enforce
structural rights.

I.

THE SUPREME COURT'S PROCEDURAL THERMIDOR

Substance and procedure have always been closely intertwined in
American constitutional jurisprudence. Justices and commentators who
are generally happy with the Court's approach to substantive issues will
logically tend also to support granting courts broad jurisdiction and
remedial authority to enforce its substantive rulings. Conversely, those
who are unhappy with the Court's substantive perspective will logically
tend (for obvious reasons) to look for procedural mechanisms that would
prevent potentially significant cases from ever reaching the courts. Thus,
early in the twentieth century, liberals on the Court who were unhappy
with a conservative Court's approach toward economic due process and
the Commerce Clause came up with the idea that the concept of standing
68. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
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could be used to limit the Court's access to cases challenging economic
regulations."' Turn the calendar forward several decades and it was also
liberals who sought to expand the concept of standing and limit other
restrictions on the federal courts' remedial authority during the period
when liberals controlled the substantive agenda of the Court.?o
It is no surprise, therefore, that as the Justices who have formed the
majority since the advent of the Burger Court have become increasingly
conservative on substantive matters, those same Justices have sought to
restrict the federal courts' jurisdiction and remedial authority in a range
of different cases involving claims based on the substantive decisions of
the previous majority." The most obvious explanation of the Court's
procedural shift to the right is that this phenomenon is merely a
Thermidorian reaction to the Jacobin excesses of the Warren Court era.
The critical aspect of the Court's reaction, however, is its somewhat
duplicitous nature. The modern Court's response to the expansion of

69. See, e.g., Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40
L. REV. 1371, 1455 (1988) (account of the historical development of the concept that standing is
a constitutional limitation on access to courts independent of the substantive merits of the lawsuit).
It is ... no accident that many of the early taxpayer standing cases involved attacks on
federal legislation addressed to an activist conservative Court. The first few were rejected
on their merits. But soon the primary stance of the liberal judicial resistance was the
development of doctrines of procedural limitation. In this formative period, Justice
Brandeis reported to his confidant Felix Frankfurter his famous remark to Justice Holmes:
"I tell him, 'the most important thing we do is not doing."' Frothingham was a product of
the liberal judicial resistance to substantive due process ....
Id. (footnotes omitted).
70. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105-o6 (1968), in which the Court at the end of the Warren
Court era greatly expanded the concept of taxpayer standing to challenge Establishment Clause
violations by the government, and came very close to embracing the concept of citizens' standing.
71. Examples of this phenomenon can be found in the Court's Establishment Clause standing
cases cited in the introduction to this Article. In Elk Grove Unified School Disrict v. Newdow, 542 U.S.
1 (2004), for example, the Court used standing doctrine to deny a father the right to challenge
allegedly unconstitutional religious activity in his daughter's school. This allowed the current Court to
avoid having to apply existing precedents regarding in-school religious activity, whose separationist
holdings have not been significantly diluted since the Warren Court era. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (1962) (holding unconstitutional state-authorized prayers in public schools); Abington Sch. Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding unconstitutional state-authorized Bible reading in public
schools).
Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2oo7), is another example. In
that case the law regarding government financing of religion had changed since the days of the Warren
Court era, but significant obstacles remain to the direct assistance and facilitation of religious activity
by the executive branch, which is what was alleged in that case. Id. at 592 (plurality opinion). Thus,
eliminating standing was an easy way to moot the substantive claims and circumvent a potentially
difficult decision. See the discussion of Hein infra notes 101-23 and accompanying text.
72. This is, of course, a reference to the right-wing reaction in 1794 to the perceived excesses of
Robespierre and the Jacobins in the French Revolution. The reaction began in the revolutionary
calendar's month of Thermidor, hence the term "Thermidorian reaction." See WILLIAM DOYLE, THE
STAN.

OXFORD HISTORY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 282-85 (2d ed. 2002) (describing the beginning of the

reaction).
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substantive rights during the Warren Court era seldom takes the form of
outright attacks on the previous Court's substantive pronouncements;
rather, the modern Court often responds in a more subtle way by seeking
to modify the very structure of the judicial system, in a way that will
prevent (or seriously impede) succeeding majorities from hearing future
cases that raise certain types of substantive issues. Substance has become
a slave to procedure, in a manner that will tie the hands of future
majorities for decades to come.
There is a thick catalogue of different ways in which the modern
Court has restricted the federal courts' jurisdiction and remedial
authority. The courts' authority has been limited at every stage of
litigation, beginning with restrictions on the initial decision to identify
litigants, then extending through the middle stages of litigation, during
which the courts have lost some of their authority to identify and
interpret substantive rights, and finally culminating with contractions in
the courts' ability to frame remedies and enforce them against
defendants who are deemed to have acted illegally. There are multiple
examples of limitations at each stage of litigation, and exploring the
intricacies of each example would require an entire law review article
unto itself. What follows, therefore, is merely a thumbnail sketch of
several major categories of procedural limitations developed by the
Supreme Court during the last three decades. These examples are
primarily intended to illustrate the scope of the Court's attack on federal
judicial authority. After briefly outlining these examples, I will turn to
the question of what the Court's procedural retreat portends for the
enforcement of structural rights.
A. UNDERMINING STRUCTURAL RIGHTS AT THE BEGINNING OF LAWSUITS:
ELIMINATING THE RIGHT TO SUE

By far the most comprehensive and systematic attack on the
remedial authority of courts during the last few decades has occurred in
the area of the standing doctrine. The Court has not only limited the
scope of the constitutional right to present claims in federal court, it has
also limited Congress's authority to provide statutory grants of standing."
Hein is only the latest example of a trend that is rapidly foreclosing the
possibility of structural rights litigation in the federal courts.
The effect of standing limits on structural rights litigation can be
seen in the Court's most important modern standing decision, Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife." By now the details of this case are intimately

73. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571-78 (1992) (using constitutional standing
limitations to restrict Congress's ability to explicitly grant individuals the authority to enforce their
legal rights).

74. Id.
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familiar to students of federal courts and constitutional law. In Lujan the
Court imposed several requirements on those seeking standing to bring
an action in federal court." The Court required all persons seeking
standing to demonstrate that their injury is concrete, imminent,
nonconectural, traceable to the defendant, and redressable by the
courts.' Although in the abstract many of these requirements are
unobjectionable guideposts as to who may litigate particular claims,
when combined and applied as the Court applied them in Lujan, these
requirements serve as almost an absolute bar to the litigation of
structural rights claims.
Lujan involved the straightforward question whether the
Endangered Species Act applied to United States government actions
outside the country." Although the case does not involve constitutional
rights, it does involve statute-based structural limitations on the
government's activity, and therefore provides a template for how the
Court's standing restrictions will apply to the litigation of structural
rights based in the Constitution. The two individuals representing the
plaintiffs in Lujan were environmental activists who were seeking to
have the Court interpret the Endangered Species Act to apply abroad as
well as domestically. 8 Both plaintiffs had traveled abroad on trips that
involved the observation of endangered species and were therefore
engaged in precisely the sort of activity that would be directly affected by
the resolution of the statutory interpretation issue at the heart of the

case. 79
Despite the obvious interest of the plaintiffs in the resolution of the
case, the Court denied standing to both plaintiffs, based on an expansive
interpretation of the standing requirements articulated in the decision.
Thus, although the Court ruled that their injury was concrete,8 the Court
found that their claim was not imminent because they could not provide
a precise date for their next trip abroad.8 ' The Court also found that the
plaintiffs' interests in the ecosystem and the animals themselves were too
conjectural to support standing." Finally, the Court held the injury was
not redressable or traceable because the plaintiffs could not demonstrate
that foreign governments receiving American money would suspend the
offending projects or modify them to do less harm to the environment if
75. Id. at 56o-6i.
76. Id.
77. Id.at 557-58.
78. Id.at 563-64.
79. Id.
8o. Id. at 562-63 ("[Tlhe desire to use or observe an animal species, even for purely esthetic
purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of standing.").
81. Id. at 564 (concluding that the plaintiffs' expectation of future visits to foreign countries did
not "produce 'imminent' injury").
82. Idat 565-67-
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the Endangered Species Act applied to future American-financed
projects.3

In short, the plaintiffs in Lujan lost on every single aspect of the
Court's standing standard except one. Given how the Court interpreted
the various standing requirements, it is doubtful that the plaintiffs could
ever have arranged the facts of their claims in a way that could satisfy
what the Court viewed as part of the Article III limitation on federal
court jurisdiction. Even if the plaintiffs could have demonstrated -for
example, through the purchase of plane tickets-that they would be
going abroad on a particular date, they would never have been able to
demonstrate that they would actually see examples of the endangered
species on those trips (because, after all, the animals are endangered and
therefore few and far between). The plaintiffs also would have been
unable to show that recipients of American money abroad would not
simply substitute money from other countries that was unencumbered by
Endangered Species Act requirements.
If others were waiting in the wings to raise the same claims as the
plaintiffs in Lujan, then at least the dismissal of the individual activists
and the groups with which they were associated would not be fatal to the
substantive claim. But it is difficult to identify other plaintiffs who could
substitute for the Lujan groups and activists. Governmental agencies will
not sue, of course, because they are the very entities that are allegedly
violating the law. Other environmental groups could not sue because (as
in Lujan) their standing would be based on the underlying injuries of
their members," all of which would be subject to the same defenses the
government raised against the two women in Lujan. And in any event,
like the Lujan plaintiffs, environmental groups would also be unable to
satisfy the requirements of traceability and redressability. So Lujan
provides us with a precise and important legal issue that procedural
obstacles will prevent anyone from ever litigating in federal court.
Although Lujan is a statutory case, it is merely the distillation of
tendencies that have been evident in the Supreme Court's constitutional
jurisprudence for many years. In several cases in the 1970s and 8os, the
Court applied many of the same factors it used in Lujan to dismiss claims
by plaintiffs raising allegations of systematic constitutional violations.
The allegations in these cases include the claim that in one county racial
discrimination permeated the criminal justice system,8 5 the claim that

83. Id. at 571 ("Respondents have produced nothing to indicate that the projects they have
named will either be suspended, or do less harm to listed species, [if American funds are]
eliminated.").
84. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972) ("It is clear that an organization whose
members are injured may represent those members in a proceeding for judicial review.").
85. See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-75 (1974) (denying standing to plaintiffs
challenging a county's pattern of racially discriminatory behavior in bond setting, sentencing, and
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racial minorities were being singled out by the Los Angeles Police
Department for the use of a potentially lethal chokehold restraint
method,M and the claim that the Philadelphia Police Department was
engaged in systematic violations of civil rights.? In all three cases the
problem was that the plaintiffs were seeking injunctions against the
violations.88 This turned out to be a problem because the Court decided
to subdivide the constitutional standing requirements depending on the
remedies sought in the lawsuit. Since injunctions are forward-looking,
the Court demanded that each of the plaintiffs show some definitive
threat of future injury, a requirement that none of the plaintiffs in these
cases could satisfy.? Thus, in the first case, the plaintiffs were dismissed
for lack of standing because they could not show that they would be
arrested and subjected to discrimination in the future;" in the second
case the plaintiff (who had been subjected to the chokehold by the
police) was not permitted to seek an injunction preventing the use of the
chokehold in a racially discriminatory manner because he could not
demonstrate that he would be stopped by the police and subjected to the
chokehold in the future;92 and in the third case the Court refused to
permit multiple plaintiffs who each had been subjected to racially
discriminatory treatment from joining together in a case challenging race
discrimination by the entire police department." In each of these cases,
the Court interpreted its constitutional standing limitations so strongly
that they were transformed into remedial limitations. These

assessing jury fees).
86. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 98, 111(1983) (denying standing to respondent
seeking an injunction against the unconstitutional use of a chokehold by the Los Angeles Police
Department); id. at i.6 & n.3 (Marshal, J., dissenting) (discussing respondent's Equal Protection
claim).
87. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 366-67, 371-73 (976) (denying standing to plaintiffs
seeking to bring a class action against the Philadelphia Police Department to challenge a pervasive
pattern of police misconduct directed toward minority citizens of Philadelphia).
88. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 98; Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 366-67; O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 492.500.
89. See supra notes 86-88.
90. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105; Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 372; O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 496-97.
91. O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 496-97 ("[H]ere the prospect of future injury rests on the likelihood that
respondents will again be arrested for and charged with violations of the criminal law and will again be
subjected to bond proceedings, trial, or sentencing before petitioners. . . . [I]t seems to us that
attempting to anticipate whether and when these respondents will be charged with crime and will be
made to appear before either petitioner takes us into the area of speculation and conjecture.").
92. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 1o5 ("That Lyons may have been illegally choked by the police on October
6, 1976, while presumably affording Lyons standing to claim damages against the individual officers
and perhaps against the City, does nothing to establish a real and immediate threat that he would
again be stopped for a traffic violation, or for any other offense, by an officer or officers who would
illegally choke him into unconsciousness without any provocation or resistance on his part.").
93. See Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 372 ("[Tlhe individual respondents' claim to 'real and immediate'
injury rests not upon what the named petitioners might do to them in the future . . . but upon what one
of a small, unnamed minority of policemen might do to them in the future because of that unknown
policeman's perception of departmental disciplinary procedures.").
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standing/remedial limitations effectively precluded an injunction from
being sought in any of these cases, which in turn prevented any effective
redress of the substantive violations alleged.
The problem does not stop with the Court's rigid reading of the
standing requirement. During the past thirty years the Court has created
a panoply of different procedural restrictions, which work together to
preclude effective relief in structural rights cases. In the case involving
the chokehold, for example, the Court blithely noted that although the
plaintiff is not permitted to seek an injunction, he could continue to seek
relief in the form of damages." The problem with this solution is that five
years earlier the Court had decided Carey v. Piphus, in which it held that
plaintiffs could not seek inferred damages in civil rights and
constitutional tort actions, but rather may collect only compensatory
damages based on concrete injuries.95 The problem with this approach is
evident in the chokehold case. The plaintiff in that case was stopped by
the police for a broken taillight while driving home from work late at
night. For reasons that are still unclear, he was taken from his car,
choked by a police officer until he passed out, and awoke several minutes
later having urinated and defecated in his pants." The police then gave
him a ticket for the taillight, and told him to leave. Under the Carey
rule, the plaintiff had little prospect for serious damages. He was not
killed, so there was no wrongful death action; he was not seriously
injured, so there were no serious medical costs; and there is no evidence
that he was psychologically traumatized. Basically, his damages
amounted to the cleaning bill for his pants. To add insult to injury, and to
further reduce the possibility that a damages action could truly serve the
function of an injunctive action, another ruling by the Supreme Court has
eliminated the possibility of an award of attorney's fees in any case in
which the plaintiff receives only nominal damages." Whatever one can

94. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 1o9 ("[H]e still has a claim for damages against the City that appears to
meet all Art. III requirements.").
95. 435 U.S. 247, 248, 262-64 (1978) (holding in the context of multiple procedural due process
violations by a public school that students were entitled to recover only nominal damages in the
absence of proof of actual injury).
96. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 114 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 114-15.
98. Id. at 15.
99. See id.at 114-15.
Too. See Farrar v. Hobby, 5o6 U.S. 103, 105 (1992) (holding that although a civil rights plaintiff

who receives only nominal damages is a "prevailing party" under the relevant statutes, the attorney
representing such a plaintiff is not entitled to attorney's fees). The logic of this decision seems to be an
extension of Carey's notion that damages awards in civil rights laws exist exclusively to compensate for
tort-style harms (as opposed to advancing the purposes of vindication or punishment). See id. at i15.
Unfortunately, the Court never really clarifies the precise connection between the compensatory
rationale for damages awards and the denial of attorney's fees beyond noting that the attorney's fee
statutes were never intended to produce windfalls for attorneys. Id
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say about the extent to which a damages action would adequately
compensate the plaintiff for his experience, it is very clear that this would
hardly be an adequate substitute for an injunction either in terms of its
ability to communicate to the police department that it had acted
wrongly or in terms of deterrence against future actions of the same sort.
And therefore-as in the statutory context of Lujan-because of a dense
thicket of procedural restrictions, violations of structural constitutional
rights essentially go unremedied.
All of these same tendencies can be seen in the Court's recent
opinion in Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc."' Hein
involved what in many ways is the quintessential structural right: the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.'o2 The Establishment
Clause exists largely to keep the government from becoming infused with
religion to the detriment of the religious liberty of the entire culture.)"
The defining paradox of the Establishment Clause is that it exists to
protect the government from religion in order to protect religion from
the government."' One of the most crucial aspects of the Establishment
Clause is its prohibition of government funding of religious activity.' 5 At
one point in the Court's history, the Court viewed this function of the
Establishment Clause as so crucial that it required special, more lenient
standing rules to permit citizens to challenge government funding of
religious enterprises.' This perception produced the decision in Flast v.
Cohen,' which exempted those challenging a funding program that

101. 551 U.S. 587 (2007)102. Id. at 592 (plurality opinion).
103. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text. For an additional perspective on this matter
from the author of the First Amendment, see Madison, supra note 35.
Rulers who wished to subvert the public liberty, may have found an established clergy
convenient auxiliaries. A just government instituted to secure & perpetuate it, needs them
not. Such a government will be best supported by protecting every citizen in the enjoyment
of his Religion with the same equal hand which protects his person and his property; by
neither invading the equal rights of any Sect, nor suffering any Sect to invade those of
another.
Id.
104. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589-90 (1992) ("It must not be forgotten then, that while
concern must be given to define the protection granted to an objector or a dissenting nonbeliever,
these same Clauses exist to protect religion from government interference.").
io5. One can see how strongly the Court viewed this aspect of the Establishment Clause in its
early cases by the absolutist phrasing of the Establishment Clause no-funding principle: "No tax in any
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they
may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion." Everson v. Bd. of
Educ., 330U.S. 1, 16 (1947).

xo6. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103-04 (1968) (allowing taxpayer standing in cases involving
Establishment Clause challenges).
I07. Id.
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violated the Establishment Clause from the usual rule that taxpayers do
not have standing to challenge the misuse of their tax dollars.'
Hein did not overrule Flast. Instead, the plurality in Hein ruled that
taxpayers have no standing to challenge executive branch expenditures
supporting religion." In other words, the Hein plurality held that the
taxpayer standing rule from Flast henceforth will be limited to cases
challenging congressional statutes that explicitly appropriate federal
funds to religious groups in violation of the Establishment Clause."o
Thus, if an agency within the executive branch distributes funds to
religious groups from a general congressional appropriation, then no
citizen could sue to stop that distribution of funds using the Flast
taxpayer standing rationale. The plurality's rationale for this conclusion
is simple formalism; the facts of Flast involved a specific congressional
appropriation of funds to religious groups, therefore the holding of the
case is effectively limited to those facts."'
The problem is that this formalistic rationale for the holding in Hein
defies the logic of the Flast holding. As six of the nine Justices voting in
Hein pointed out (the four dissenters plus the two concurring Justices
Scalia and Thomas), the holding of Hein is essentially irrational. Both the
Hein dissent and the concurrences of Justices Scalia and Thomas argued
that it is illogical to treat Flast as applying only in the case of specific
congressional appropriations of funds because a general appropriation of
funds engages Congress's Article III authority in exactly the same way as
a specific allocation of funds, and therefore logically implicates the
taxpayer standing authority to precisely the same extent."' The logic of
Flast is that taxpayer standing is justified in lawsuits challenging
Establishment Clause violations because taxpayers have a direct
connection to the claim insofar as their tax money is being used in
violation of the First Amendment."' This is true regardless of whether

lo8. Id. at io6; see Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488-89 (1923) (holding that in general
taxpayers have no standing to challenge the constitutionality of federal statutes).
io9. See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 609 (2007) (plurality opinion)
("Flast focused on congressional action, and we must decline this invitation to extend its holding to
encompass discretionary Executive Branch expenditures.").
i 1o. Id. at 6io-ii.
iii. Id. at 603-o5.
112. See id at 618 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Either [Flast] should be applied to (at a minimum) all

challenges to the governmental expenditure of general tax revenues in a matter alleged to violate a
constitutional provision specifically limiting the taxing and spending power, or Flast should be
repudiated."); id. at 637 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[T]he controlling opinion closes the door on these
taxpayers because the Executive Branch, and not the Legislative Branch, caused their injury. I see no
basis for this distinction in either logic or precedent . . . .").
113. See Flast, 392 U.S. at io6 (recognizing as a valid injury for standing purposes the claim that
"tax money is being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against [the]
abuse[] of legislative power").
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the funds are being allocated for impermissible purposes by executive
branch officials or Congress.
The effect of Hein on Establishment Clause litigation could be
devastating. Although Hein itself involved executive branch allocations
of funds in violation of the Establishment Clause, the real question is
what effect Hein will have on future litigation of Establishment Clause
challenges to state and local programs funding religion. Justice Alito's
opinion in Hein very strictly limits the taxpayer standing authority
granted by Flast to cases in which Congress itself has violated First
Amendment limitations on the Article III authority to appropriate
funds." 4 The precise holding of Hein is that Flast taxpayer standing
authority does not extend even to branches of the federal government
other than Congress."' If Flast no longer even covers constitutional
violations by the executive branch of the federal government, then
almost by definition taxpayer standing no longer exists to challenge state
and local funding programs that violate the Establishment Clause. The
routine assumption to this point is that Flast covers state and local, as
well as federal programs."' If Hein indeed casts doubt upon this routine
assumption, then the implications of Hein are much more serious than
one may initially surmise from reading the relatively sketchy Hein
plurality opinion. The Bush Administration aside, historically there have
been very few cases in which the executive branch has decided on its own
to allocate funds for religious purposes without congressional assent. On
the other hand, because many of the disputes involving government
funding of religious institutions involve education, which is largely a
localized affair in this country, challenges to state and local attempts to
fund religious institutions are far more routine."' If Hein means that
taxpayer standing may no longer be employed to challenge state and
local financial violations of the Establishment Clause, then the case will

114. Hein, 551 U.S. at 609 (plurality opinion) ("Flast focused on congressional action, and we must
decline this invitation to extend its holding to encompass discretionary Executive Branch
expenditures.").
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 380-8i (1985) (taxpayer standing
challenge to local program providing state assistance to private religious schools); Marsh v. Chambers,
463 U.S. 783, 785 (1983) (taxpayer standing challenge to Nebraska practice of using state funds to pay
legislative chaplains); Soc'y of Separationists, Inc. v. Herman, 959 F.2d 1283, 1297 n.ii (5th Cir. 1992)
(Goldberg, J., dissenting); Wilder v. Bernstein, 645 F. Supp. 1292, 13o10 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
117. Major cases of this sort have reached the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Zelman v. SimmonsHarris, 536 U.S. 639, 648 (2oo2) (taxpayer standing challenge to Cleveland educational voucher
system); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 8ot (2000) (taxpayer standing challenge to Louisiana
program providing educational materials to religious schools); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist., 473 U.S. at 38o
(taxpayer standing challenge to local program providing state assistance to private religious schools);
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 392 (1983) (taxpayer standing challenge to Minnesota program
providing tax deductions for the expenses of sending children to religious schools).
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seriously inhibit the enforcement of the Establishment Clause in the
future.
Beyond the actual holding of Hein, the larger problem with the
decision is the general spirit of each of the opinions in the plurality.
Although Justice Alito's plurality opinion diverges from Justice Scalia's
concurring opinion with regard to the continued viability of a narrow
version of Flast, the overall tone of the two opinions is actually quite
similar. Both Justice Alito and Justice Scalia are very skeptical of
anything that resembles ideological litigation: that is, litigation on behalf
of someone who has not suffered a common-law-tort-style, highly
individualized injury."8 Much of Justice Scalia's concurring opinion is
given over to a discussion of the inadequacy of what he calls "psychic
injuries" (which he contrasts with "wallet injuries")" 9 as the basis for
standing under Article II. This general theme-that standing should be
narrowed to cover only tort-style, individualized injuries-signals the
possibility of subsequent attacks by the Court's new conservative
majority on attempts to enforce the Establishment Clause in contexts
other than the funding of religion. In particular, it may presage an effort
to limit standing that is based on simple exposure to instances of
governmental endorsement of religion, in the absence of some additional
coercive measure such as a requirement to participate in a prayer. 20 If
this effort to further limit Establishment Clause standing comes to pass,
it would effectively eliminate most litigation against government
endorsement of religion and religious symbols outside the public schools.
In the public school context standing presumably will still be freely
available, since the coercion inherent in mandatory attendance rules
leads Justice Kennedy to abandon his conservative colleagues and
recognize that government endorsement causes harm to identifiable
individual students.' 2

18. See Hein, 551 U.S. at 609-1o (plurality opinion) (noting the limitations of Flast and expressing
doubts about the viability of standing in the absence of individualized injury).
i19. Id. at 619 (Scalia, J., concurring).
120. We will soon have an indication from the Supreme Court regarding whether it intends to limit
standing in Establishment Clause cases beyond those involving taxpayer standing. The Court has
granted certiorari in Salazar v. Buono, 129 S. Ct. 1313 (2009) (granting certiorari). Salazar involves an
Establishment Clause challenge to the placement of a Latin cross in the Mojave National Preserve,
which is located in Southeastern California and operated by the National Park Service. See Buono v.
Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 768 (9th Cir. 2oo8). cert. granted sub nom. Salazar v. Buono, 129 S. Ct. 1313
(Feb. 23, 2oo9) (No. 08-472). The plaintiff in the case is a former employee of the National Park
Service, whose standing is based on the claim that he is being subjected to unwanted exposure to
illegal religious speech by the government. Id. at 770. Whether the Court permits standing in this case
will reveal much about whether the Court intends Hein to be an idiosyncratic and narrow decision, or
rather see it as merely the first salvo in a broader attack on Establishment Clause standing generally.
121. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587-90 (1992). Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Lee
held that a nondenominational prayer at a high school graduation ceremony violated the First
Amendment rights of a student attending the ceremony. Id.
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The more general point is that efforts to impose upon plaintiffs
seeking to redress constitutional violations a requirement that they show
direct injuries that are the equivalent of an assault or a conversion of
property is deeply misguided and inconsistent with the constitutional
structure. A tort-style injury requirement will render it impossible to
adequately enforce constitutional rights generally, and will have the
effect of virtually exterminating structural constitutional rights. The
Establishment Clause dispute litigated in Hein provides a perfect
example of this phenomenon. The Establishment Clause is a
quintessential example of a structural right; it is designed to structure
government in a way that prevents powerful religious groups or
institutions from taking over the government and using it to advance
their own sectarian ends."' The Establishment Clause is also designed to
preserve the essential democratic characteristic of a temporal
government, in the sense that it forces the government to focus on
worldly matters and adopt policies that are recognized by all to be both
temporary and imperfect."' The Establishment Clause creates a
democratic government that concerns itself with earthly affairs, which
leaves the salvation of souls to other institutions. Unfortunately,
violations of these sorts of structural protections of democratic
government often do not result in the direct coercion of any individual or
church, and therefore often do not result in the sorts of tort-style injuries
that would be required if the Court follows the standing theory of Hein
to its logical conclusion.
The ultimate conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is that if
the Court proceeds down the path it seems to have chosen, then multiple
constitutional provisions will be rendered virtually unenforceable. The
Court's implicit response is that these provisions are unenforceable
because the government's violation of these provisions will never injure
122. See Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. i16, 125-26 (1982) ("[T]he mere appearance of a
joint exercise of legislative authority by Church and State provides a significant symbolic benefit to
religion in the minds of some by reason of the power conferred. It does not strain our prior holdings to
say that the statute [in question] can be seen as having a 'primary' and 'principal' effect of advancing
religion.").
123. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our
ConstitutionalOrder, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37, 84 (2002).
[T]his new [constitutional] order rested, in important part, on its limited horizon. The order
would belong to "the ages," and its powers would be restricted to the temporal welfare of its
citizens. Though each of them might (indeed likely would) have religious commitments, the
state itself would have no religious confession to make. By thus circumscribing the
government's jurisdiction, this new world order would avoid both conflict among religious
factions for political authority and the inevitable despotism of the religious faction that won
out. Seen in political terms, "religion" represents that which the new order disclaims:
jurisdiction over ultimate truths, a comprehensive claim to undivided loyalty, and a
command to worship.
Id.
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anyone to a sufficient degree to justify engaging the machinery of the
judiciary. But with regard to structural rights, the reality is not that their
violation injures no one, but rather that their violation injures everyone.
Ironically, under the Court's recent standing doctrine, the more
widespread the injury, the less likely that injury will ever be redressed by
the courts.

B.

UNDERMINING STRUCTURAL RIGHTS IN THE MiDDLE OF LAWSUITS:
ELIMINATING THE ABILITY TO CHALLENGE VIOLATIONS OF STRUCTURAL

RIGHTs EFFECTIVELY
Imposing limits on standing at the outset of litigation is hardly the
only way in which the modern Court has made it more difficult to
enforce structural rights. As the headings in this Part indicate, the Court
has limited structural rights litigation at every stage of the litigation
process. Not all of the Court's litigation-limiting efforts have been
entirely successful. While the current Court's Thermidorian Reaction in
the standing area has almost completely vanquished the Jacobin
tendencies of the Warren Court era, other efforts by the Court to dilute
or eradicate existing mechanisms for remedying constitutional violations
are still very much in flux. One example of such a dispute is the ongoing
argument within the Court over the continued viability and applicability
of facial challenges to unconstitutional statutes.
Facial challenges to unconstitutional statutes are fixtures of
constitutional litigation, albeit controversial ones. 2 4 They are especially
important in First Amendment litigation, where a facial challenge is
brought as a facial overbreadth claim-that is, the claim that a statute
regulating speech is unconstitutional because the challenged statute
regulates a substantial amount of constitutionally-protected speech."' It
is not difficult to understand why plaintiffs challenging a structural rights
violation value the ability to raise a facial challenge to unconstitutional
statutes. The main value of a facial challenge is in the type of remedy that
a successful lawsuit produces. A lawsuit that successfully raises a facial
challenge to an unconstitutional statute will produce an injunction
against the entire statute.'26 Thus, the statute may not be employed
against anyone until it is rewritten and narrowed by the legislature. A
successful facial challenge protects the entire world from the

124. Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 6oo, 6o9-Io (2004) (noting that facial challenges should be
"discouraged," but then noting a series of constitutional areas in which facial challenges are routinely
permitted).
125. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 6oi, 615-16 (1973) (discussing the standards that apply
to substantial overbreadth claims in First Amendment cases).
126. See United States v. Frandsen, 212 F.3d 1231, 1235 (iith Cir. 2000) ("A facial challenge, as
distinguished from an as-applied challenge, seeks to invalidate a statute or regulation itself.... The
remedy if the facial challenge is successful is the striking down of the regulation...)
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government's unconstitutional conduct. This scattershot aspect to the
facial challenge is not just an unfortunate byproduct; rather, it is the
entire point of the doctrine that permits such challenges to take place.
Indeed, within First Amendment jurisprudence the courts have
traditionally considered it so important to protect everyone against the
"chilling effect" produced by an unconstitutional statute that they have
generated special standing rules for overbreadth challenges to statutes.
These rules allow a litigant to raise a facial overbreadth challenge to an
unconstitutional statute even if that litigant was engaged in
constitutionally unprotected expression and therefore was not personally
affected by the challenged statute's overbreadth.'"
In contrast to a successful facial challenge, a successful as-applied
challenge to an unconstitutional statute will produce an injunction that
protects only the particular conduct that is litigated in that particular
lawsuit."' The statute remains on the books and can therefore be used to
regulate others. Every other small variation in facts will require a
different lawsuit to challenge the application of the statute in that
circumstance. If the major advantage of a facial challenge is that
plaintiffs will obtain a very broad (and therefore very effective)
injunction at the end of a successful lawsuit, the major detriment of an
as-applied challenge is the cost and pragmatic obstacles of mounting
effective challenges to flawed statutes. If a facial challenge is unavailable,
then only repeated litigation can effectively address the problems-even
if the constitutional problems are recurrent, endemic, and inherent in the
statutory language. Given factors such as the limitations on damages and
attorney's fees discussed in the previous section,'29 the sort of repeated
litigation required in these cases will often be impracticable.
This issue is especially troublesome when statutes are worded so
broadly or vaguely that they permit (or even encourage) unconstitutional
implementation and enforcement. One example of this phenomenon is
Bowen v. Kendrick, an early challenge to government financing of social
services by religious organizations. 3 o Bowen involved an Establishment
Clause challenge to the Adolescent Family Life Act, which provided
federal funding to organizations engaged in counseling related to
adolescent sexual activity and pregnancy."3' Two factors raised concerns
about this statute's compatibility with the Establishment Clause's broad

127. See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503 (1985) ("[A]n individual whose own
speech or expressive conduct may validly be prohibited or sanctioned is permitted to challenge a
statute on its face because it also threatens others not before the court . . . .").
128. See United States v. Faasse, 265 F-3d 475, 487 n.io (6th Cir. 2001) ("The appropriate remedy
for [an] as-applied challenge would be to invalidate the statute as to [the claimant].").
129. See supra notes 95-Too and accompanying text.

130. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).

131. Id. at 593.
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prohibition on government funding of religious activity. First, the statute
specifically encouraged government funding of religious groups in an
Second, the plaintiffs had
area fraught with religious concerns.'
extensive evidence of religious groups advancing their sectarian views in
programs funded under the Act.'33 Nevertheless, the Court rejected the
plaintiffs' facial challenge to the statute.'34 The Court left open the
prospect that plaintiffs could raise a string of as-applied claims against
particular grants when those grants were made to pervasively sectarian
organizations, or were used impermissibly for religious activities.'
The impracticalities of the as-applied approach are evident in
Bowen. Bowen is also a good illustration of how the shift from facial to
as-applied challenges tilts the playing field sharply against those seeking
to enforce structural rights. This happens in two ways, both of which are
evident in Bowen. First, by rejecting the facial claim in favor of an asapplied challenge, the majority in Bowen was able to ignore much of the
extensive factual record that the plaintiffs had assembled in the district
court, which in turn allowed the Court to neuter part of the relevant
constitutional standard.' 6 This is ironic, given the fact that one of the
usual explanations for disfavoring facial challenges to unconstitutional
statutes is that such challenges raised the risk of "'premature
interpretatio[n] of statutes' on the basis of factually barebones
records."' Treating these issues as as-applied claims skews the playing
field in favor of the government in a second way by fundamentally
altering the nature of the plaintiffs' claim. As the Bowen dissenters
noted, "this lawsuit has been litigated primarily as a broad challenge to
the statutory scheme as a whole, not just to the awarding of grants to a
few individual applicants."' 8 In short, the Court in Bowen created a
series of practical and financial obstacles inhibiting challenges to
comprehensive constitutional violations, excluded from consideration the
plaintiffs' widespread factual evidence related to those comprehensive
constitutional violations, and provided itself with a mechanism for
converting the plaintiffs' broad and generalized claim against an entire

132. Id. at 606-o9.

133. See id. at 625-26, 642 H.12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 618 (majority opinion) (holding that the Adolescent Family Life Act, on its face, does
not violate the Establishment Clause).
135. Id. at 620-22.
136. Id. at 627 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("By designating appellees' broad attack on the statute as
a 'facial' challenge, the majority justifies divorcing its analysis from the extensive record developed in
the District Court, and thereby strips the challenge of much of its force and renders the evaluation of
the Lemon 'effects' prong particularly sterile and meaningless.").
137. Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 6oo, 6o9 (2oo4) (alteration in original) (quoting United States
v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1959)) (rejecting facial challenge to a federal bribery statute).

487 U.S. at 628 (Blackmun. J., dissenting).
138. BowenT
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statutory framework into a series of narrow and relatively insignificant
claims against individual grant recipients.
The dispute within the Bowen Court over facial versus as-applied
challenges was merely the first salvo of what has become an all-out battle
within the Court over how to litigate constitutional-law issues. Most of
the recent examples of this dispute within the Court are centered around
the so-called "Salerno rule."' The fight in favor of the Salerno rule, and
therefore against most facial challenges, has been led by Justice Scalia.
Justice Scalia has for many years contended that the Salerno rule should
not govern all constitutional disputes outside the First Amendment free
speech area 40 (where he apparently concedes that the overbreadth
doctrine does have a legitimate pedigree and serves a valid role4'). The
Salerno rule states that a statute may be challenged on its face only if "no
set of circumstances exist under which the Act would be valid."42 Thus,
in a case governed by the Salerno rule, the government could avoid
having a statute held facially unconstitutional by coming up with a single
constitutional application of that statute. As a practical matter, in a world
governed by the Salerno rule, facial challenges would be reduced to
situations in which the government has been either stupid or irrational.'43
If Salerno applied without exception to all constitutional challenges, an
overwhelming majority of cases would be shifted to the realm of the
narrow and piecemeal as-applied challenge.
The precise status of the Salerno rule is uncertain, although it seems
that a majority of the present members of the Supreme Court reject the
notion that the rule should be applied to all cases. It also seems clear,
however, that all of the current members of the Court would apply the
rule to many types of disputes. The dispute, therefore, centers on
whether there are exceptions to the Salerno rule, and what those
exceptions are. The clearest statement of how the Court's current
majority would apply the Salerno rule appears in Sabri v. United States, a
decision involving a Spending Clause challenge to the application of a
federal bribery statute in a local bribery case.'" In Sabri a majority of the

139. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745-46 (1987) (rejecting facial challenge to the Bail
Reform Act's authorization of pretrial detention on grounds of future dangerousness).
140. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41. 73-83 (i 99) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing at
length his argument that federal courts have no Article III authority to declare statutes
unconstitutional on their face).
141. See id. at 79 n.2 ("[T]he overbreadth doctrine is a specialized exception to the general rule for
facial challenges, justified in light of the risk that an overbroad statutes will chill free expression.").
142. Salerno,481 U.S. at 745.
143. For an example of the latter, see Board of Airport Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482
U.S. 569, 571, 577 (1987), which held facially unconstitutional a Los Angeles ordinance making it
illegal to "engage in First Amendment activities within the Central Terminal Area of Los Angeles
International Airport."
144. 54'I U.S. 6oo, 6o2-o4 (2oo4).
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Court rejected on Salerno grounds the defendant's attempt to raise a
facial challenge to the federal statute.'45 At the same time, the majority
provided a list of different constitutional law categories in which facial
challenges routinely should be permitted."'6 Those categories include free
speech, right to travel, abortion rights, and legislation under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment."' Justice Kennedy submitted a cryptic
concurring opinion, joined by Justice Scalia, which suggested that a
similar exception should be made for Commerce Clause challenges to
federal statutes.148
Even though a majority of the Supreme Court agrees that Salerno
should govern at least some constitutional disputes, the list of exceptions
to the Salerno rule is fairly limited and falls far short of the full range of
constitutional provisions that could be construed as structural rights.
Even under the most liberal application of the Salerno rule within the
current Supreme Court, therefore, the rule imposes significant burdens
on litigants attempting to enforce structural rights.
The nature of those burdens is clearly evident from a recent dispute
involving the abortion rights of minors in Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood
of Northern New England.'49 The case involved a constitutional challenge
to New Hampshire's parental notification abortion statute.'o The statute
did not contain a provision allowing a physician to perform an abortion
in a medical emergency without complying with the statute's notification
requirements, which the plaintiffs argued was a violation of federal
constitutional privacy rights."' Because a series of decisions by the
Supreme Court since Roe v. Wade have effectively mandated a medical
emergency exception to abortion regulations in order to protect the
health of women seeking the procedure,' the obvious approach in
Ayotte would be the one taken by the lower courts, both of which struck
down the New Hampshire statute on its face.' The unanimous Supreme
Court, however, decided to take a different approach.5 4 In the Supreme

145. Id. at 604-05.
146. Id. at 60-1i0.

147. Id.
148. Id. at 6to (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
149. 546 U.S. 320,323 (2006).

150. Id. at 323-25.
151.

Id. at 324-25.

See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 929-30 (2ooo) (discussing the need for exceptions to
government regulation of abortion where necessary to protect the health of the pregnant woman);
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992) (plurality opinion) (same), Roe v.
152.

Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973) (same).

153. See Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng. v. Heed,

296

F. Supp. 2d 59, 65 (D.N.H. 2003), affd,

390 F.3d 53, 58 (2004).

154. The Court would be far more divided when the majority issued a similar ruling one Term later
in Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 16io (2007). In Gonzales the Court rejected a facial challenge to the
federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, even though the Act banned a procedure that in some
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Court, the state conceded (and in its opinion the Court reiterated) that,
as a factual matter, some women need immediate abortions to avoid
serious damage to their health, and as a legal matter, the Constitution
requires states to provide women who need them access to such
immediate abortions."' Nevertheless, despite the fact that the state
essentially conceded that the statute as written was unconstitutional on
its face, the Supreme Court rejected the lower courts' approach of facial
invalidation, remanded the case to the lower courts, and essentially
recommended that the lower courts rewrite the statute by injunction'while simultaneously and inconsistently maintaining that "we restrain
ourselves from 'rewrit[ing] state law to conform it to constitutional
requirements.""5 " The Court suggested that "[o]nly a few applications of
New Hampshire's parental notification statute would present a
constitutional problem," and therefore a narrow injunction "prohibiting
unconstitutional applications" may be sufficient to take care of any
constitutional concerns.15
If viewed in the abstract, the Court is clearly right: an injunction
prohibiting a statute from being applied unconstitutionally would by
definition satisfy any theoretical constitutional concerns. But the world
of privacy law as applied to abortion rights is not lived in the abstract;
this world exists in a complicated morass of personal, psychological,
sociological, and medical facts. If the Court had granted the plaintiffs'
facial challenge, the state legislature would have been forced to draft a
new statute with specific guidelines as to what constituted a medical
emergency. An injunction prohibiting the state from applying its statute
in medical emergencies, on the other hand, will leave the state free to
define "medical emergency" on a case-by-case basis. This unfortunate
fact leaves patients and doctors adrift, without any clear indication of
when the New Hampshire law applies and when it does not. The
Supreme Court's solution to this dilemma is to permit patients and

instances may be medically necessary to protect the health of pregnant women. Id. at 1619-20. The
Supreme Court held that the lower courts should not have considered a facial challenge to the statute,
but rather should have forced doctors and patients to bring as-applied challenges in particular cases.
Id. at 1638-39. "[An as-applied challenge] is the proper manner to protect the health of the woman if it
can be shown that in discreet and well-defined instances a particular condition has or is likely to occur
in which the procedure prohibited by the Act must be used." Id.
155. Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 328.
156. Id. at 330-32. The Supreme Court opinion left alive for the lower courts the option of striking
down the statute altogether if the lower courts found that the state legislature had expressed the
specific intent that it preferred the courts to strike down the statute rather than modify the statute in
any way. Id. at 331. Before the lower courts could make this determination, the legislature repealed
the statute and the lawsuit was dismissed as moot. See Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng. v. Ayotte,
571 F. Supp. 2d 265, 270-71 (D.N.H. 2008).
157. Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 329 (alteration in original) (quoting Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, 484
U.S. 383,397 (1988)).
_58.
Id. at 331-32.
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doctors to bring as-applied challenges in individual situations.
Unfortunately, this solution does nothing for doctors who are
confronting what they believe may be a true medical emergency. In such
a scenario, the doctor has only two options. Under the first option, the
doctor could go to court to obtain an injunction against the application of
the statute in the particular situation at hand-an option that is
thoroughly impractical if the doctor is in the midst of an urgent medical
crisis requiring immediate attention. Under the second option, the doctor
could go ahead and perform the procedure without going to court,
thereby subjecting him- or herself to second guessing by state authorities
at a later time, followed by the possibility of criminal, civil, or
administrative sanctions. This is precisely the sort of ad hoc state
oversight of medical care that the Court has always forbidden in the
abortion context.' What was lost on the Court in Ayotte is that the only
way to avoid such unwarranted oversight of sensitive medical procedures
is to eschew the ad hoc legal construction of a questionable statute via a
series of as-applied challenges to the statute's constitutionality.
The debate within the Supreme Court over the use of facial
challenges to unconstitutional statutes has focused on two things: first,
the supposed impracticalities of using facial challenges to resolve
constitutional disputes, and second, judicial-restraint concerns, in both
their separation of powers and federalism manifestations." The
academic literature has generally been critical of attempts by some
members of the Court to limit facial challenges, but the academic
critiques generate other conceptual concerns that may inhibit the use of
facial challenges to enforce structural rights. Professor Richard Fallon,
for example, has argued that all challenges to statutes are in one sense asapplied challenges (since the lawsuit originates with the argument that
the statute cannot be applied to the plaintiff), and that most statutes have
a series of constitutional subrules that are separable from the
unconstitutional subrules.' 6' Nevertheless, Fallon argues that the
application of certain legal doctrines "yield[s] the conclusion that a
statute is invalid, not merely as applied to the facts, but more generally
or even in whole."162 In other words, "when a court upholds a
constitutional challenge, the nature of the test that it applies will
159. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379. 396 (979) (holding unconstitutional a Pennsylvania
abortion regulation imposing a high standard of care on doctors who performed abortions on fetuses
that "may be viable" on the ground that the statute "could have a profound chilling effect on the
willingness of physicians to perform abortions near the point of viability in the manner indicated by
their best medical judgment").
16o. See Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 328-31 (discussing both the practical and theoretical concerns with
facial challenges).
161. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 1321 1334-41 (2ooo).
162. Id. at 1337.
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determine whether the statute is found unconstitutional solely as applied,
in part, or in whole."' Professor Fallon then describes four categories of
constitutional rules, and concludes that one category of rules is most
likely to justify facial constitutional challenges. This category includes
rules that demand that a statute fully specify the behavior it covers at the
outset and limits the separability of subrules within statutes that are
otherwise found unconstitutional.
The overall thrust of Professor Fallon's critique of the debate over
facial versus as-applied constitutional challenges is that there is no
general set of rules regarding facial challenges that should apply across
the board. Rather, Professor Fallon would have us look to the underlying
doctrinal rules governing individual substantive claims to determine
whether a facial challenge should be permitted in any particular
instance.' The problem with this approach is that it may lend itself to
haphazard and piecemeal litigation over constitutional provisions that
are designed to serve a much more comprehensive function in regulating
the government's behavior. This assertion is only conditional because
Professor Fallon leaves himself a fairly large escape hatch from his
endorsement of the proposition that as-applied challenges should remain
the norm in constitutional adjudication.' The escape hatch is provided
by his acknowledgment that the courts should continue to routinely
recognize facial challenges to unconstitutional statutes within a certain
category of cases. Professor Fallon describes this category as follows:
[W]here constitutional values are unusually vulnerable, the Supreme
Court can authorize the robust protection afforded by tests that invite
rulings of facial invalidity and preclude the case-by-case curing of
statutory defects. This approach most commends itself when a
constitutional provision both affords protection to speech or conduct
that is especially prone to "chill" and reflects a value that legislatures
may be unusually disposed to undervalue in the absence of a significant
judicially established disincentive.'
Although Professor Fallon seems to intend this definition to be
fairly narrow, if applied honestly it would seem to encompass the entirety
of what I call structural rights. These rights are intended to define the
borders between government coercion and individual autonomy in order
to preserve the ability of individuals to join together to oust any
government that is not responsive to their needs. Thus, government
intrusions into these areas of individual autonomy or government
attempts to undermine these structural protections will almost inevitably
"chill" individual conduct. More importantly, since governmental efforts
163. Id. at 1339.
164. Id. at 1344-46.
165. Id.at 1350 n-147.

166. Id.at 1352.
167. Id(citations omitted).

November 2009]

ANNIHILATION OF STRUCTURAL RIGHTS

41

to undermine the structural protection of the democratic political
structure will be intended to benefit those currently controlling the
political branches of government, such efforts will almost by definition
involve the sorts of constitutional limitations that legislatures are prone
to undervalue in the absence of strong judicial sanctions. Thus, at least
with regard to its application to structural rights, Professor Fallon's
exception may swallow his rule.
In the ongoing debate over the inadvisability or impermissibility of
facial challenges to unconstitutional statutes, there are many different
variations on the same themes discussed by Professor Fallon. Like
Professor Fallon, many of these discussions reject the Court's assertion
that it permits facial challenges only when all applications of a given
statute are unconstitutional. Professor Michael Dorf argues, for example,
that the Supreme Court really does not have a specific doctrine regarding
facial and as-applied challenges, but rather employs in some
circumstances a presumption of severability to salvage part of an
otherwise unconstitutional statute." The real question, therefore, is not
whether a statute may be challenged on its face, but rather whether some
portions of a challenged statute may be severed from others and thereby
survive a constitutional challenge.' Professor Dorf then notes several
substantive constitutional limitations on the applicability of the
presumption of severability that he considers to be the true basis of the
Salerno rule.'7 0 These substantive limitations include Equal Protection
Clause challenges to underinclusive statutes,"' the use of the overbreadth
doctrine in First Amendment and some fundamental rights cases,'"2 and
the application of the Establishment Clause to prohibit government
action motivated by impermissible religious purposes." 3
I would suggest adding to the list of substantive constitutional limits
on the Salerno rule the concept of structural rights. Like the other
categories of limitations on Salerno mentioned by Professor Dorf, the
substantive nature of structural rights make them particularly
incompatible with as-applied challenges. As in cases involving equal
protection underinclusiveness claims, it is difficult to fashion an adequate
severability remedy in a structural rights challenge. In this respect, a
structural rights challenge is most closely analogous to an
unconstitutional purpose challenge under the Establishment Clause. In

168. Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REv. 235, 249-50
(1994).
169. Id. at 249 ("The answer depends on whether the court treats the unconstitutional applications
of the statute as severable from the constitutional ones.").
170. Id. at 251-81.

171. Id. at251--61
Id.at 261-79.
173. Id at 279-81.
172.
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an Establishment Clause case, once the plaintiff has demonstrated that a
statute is in fact motivated by an impermissible purpose, then the entire
statute is tainted and must be held unconstitutional.'74 No severability is
possible. Likewise, once it is established in a structural rights case that
the government is doing something that it is not empowered to do, then
any attempt to sever part of the statute would be absurd, since the
government is also disempowered from engaging in the same actions
against others not presently in court. In this way, therefore, structural
rights are also analogous to Professor Dorf's third substantive limitation
The
on the severability presumption-the overbreadth doctrine.'
overbreadth doctrine exists in large part to prevent the government from
engaging in actions that chill the rights of those who are not in court, and
indeed was recognized as serving this function even in Salerno itself.' 6 By
the same token, the very purpose of structural rights is to preserve the
political independence of everyone in society-including those who
belong to groups that are currently out of power or highly unpopular, or
who do not choose to engage in direct action against the government, or
who do not choose for the moment to exercise their rights as citizens to
take part in political activity. Thus, it is logical in structural rights
litigation, as it is in litigation raising First Amendment overbreadth
challenges, to freely permit facial challenges to statutes that violate these
rights.
The discussions of Professors Fallon and Dorf are important
because they reject the Court's chosen focus of the debate over Salerno
as a substantively neutral rule advancing the equally neutral cause of
judicial restraint, and instead view the debate as involving a substantively
loaded procedural mechanism that is regularly employed to dilute or
deny access to certain types of rights. Once it is recognized that the fight
over Salerno is really a fight about substance rather than procedure, then
the question turns to whether structural rights actually serve the
important functions described in Part I, supra. If the assumption of this
Article is correct and structural rights do indeed serve an indispensable
function within a constitutional democracy, then the debate over the
application of the Salerno rule should turn exclusively on the question
whether in the absence of facial challenges structural rights could be
enforced effectively or at all. An honest answer to this question would

174. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 590-94 (1987) (holding unconstitutional on its face a
Louisiana creationism statute because the statute lacked a secular purpose); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (setting forth the requirement that a statute must have a secular purpose to
comply with the Establishment Clause).
175. See Dorf, supra note 168, at 261-79.
176. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 79 n.2 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("As Salerno
noted, the overbreadth doctrine is a specialized exception to the general rule for facial challenges,
justified in light of the risk that an overbroad statute will chill free expression." (citation omitted)).
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have to acknowledge that many if not most structural rights would not be
enforceable in the absence of the free availability of facial challenges to
statutes that infringe those rights. Thus, the procedural decision to
enforce Salerno silently encompasses the underlying decision not to
enforce most substantive rights. Once again, therefore, as in the standing
area, the debate within the current Court over procedural limitations on
constitutional litigation has substantive implications that the Court is not
willing to acknowledge.
C.

UNDERMINING STRUCTURAL RIGHTS AT THE END OF LAWSurrs:
ELIMINATING REMEDIES

We have seen in the first two sections how the Supreme Court is
using its authority to fashion procedural rules that undercut the
enforcement of structural rights. The Court does this at the beginning of
the lawsuit by imposing restrictive standing rules that make it difficult for
anyone not suffering a tort-style injury to bring a matter to the courts'
attention, and it does this once the lawsuit begins by imposing severe
restrictions on how unconstitutional statutes can be attacked. This
section looks to the culmination of a lawsuit, and once again the trend
described in the previous sections holds true: in recent years the Supreme
Court has developed a body of remedial jurisprudence that threatens to
eliminate any chance of redressing structural rights violations by
governmental actors-even if those violations are proved in court or
admitted by the government. If this observation is accurate, then once
again the Court is using procedural mechanisms to render various
structural rights meaningless.
Several caveats must be offered at the outset of this discussion. First
of all, the body of law addressed here is somewhat esoteric, and the
relevant precedents stretch back several decades. Moreover, the Court
has not entirely settled on its present stance on the continued validity of
these precedents. Finally, there are significant connections between the
remedial theories of these cases-especially cases dealing with statutory
remedies and those dealing with constitutional remedies-that most
Justices on the Court (with usual exception of Justice Scalia) have not yet
recognized. With all those caveats in mind, it nevertheless seems clear
that the Court is poised on the brink of fundamentally revamping its view
of whether violations of constitutional rights-especially structural
rights-may be remedied in court in the absence of congressional
authorization of the remedy.
Phrased narrowly, the issue addressed in this section is: Do the
federal courts have inherent remedial authority to redress violations of
structural constitutional rights by granting relief in the form of
injunctions, declaratory judgments, or damages to victims of illegal
conduct by the government? The debate over this issue has been going
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on for many years, and for the moment the faction of the Court that
would grant legal relief seems to maintain its narrow majority."' This
conclusion is cast into doubt somewhat by a series of recent decisions in
cases involving the courts' inherent authority to fashion relief for
violations of federal statutes that do not include specific grants of
remedial authority. In several of these cases the Court has refused to
infer a remedy, using arguments that could easily be applied to cases in
which the Court is being asked to infer remedies for constitutional
violations. Although Justice Scalia has drawn the links between the
statutory and constitutional cases, the very different considerations that
apply to the inference of statutory and constitutional remedies make
unclear the extent to which Justice Scalia has convinced other Justices to
abandon the concept of inferred constitutional remedies.
In the constitutional area, the debate over the Court's authority to
infer remedies to redress constitutional violations has for the moment
been settled by the Court's decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of FederalBureau of Narcotics."' Bivens authorized federal courts
operating under nothing more than the general statutory grant of federal
question jurisdiction 9 to award civil damages to the victims of Fourth
Amendment violations by federal agents.' The question was whether
the absence of a specific statutory grant of remedial authority rendered
such an award impermissible. The essence of the conservative position
on inferred constitutional remedies was stated in Bivens by Justice Black,
who vociferously disagreed with the majority that federal courts have the
inherent authority to remedy constitutional violations: "The task of
evaluating the pros and cons of creating judicial remedies for particular
wrongs is a matter for Congress and the legislatures of the States."' 8' The
conservative position is, in other words, essentially about preserving the
separation of powers. Just as the courts have no inherent authority to
create their own jurisdiction, the argument goes, they also have no
authority to give themselves the power to remedy particular substantive
offenses.
The rejoinder to this position obviously must rest on the concept of
inherent judicial authority, but judicial discussions of constitutional
remedies often provide little in the way of precise rationales for granting
courts the ability to infer remedies without specific statutory
authorization. Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Bivens, for example,
offers little more than remedial homilies: "The question is merely
whether petitioner, if he can demonstrate an injury consequent upon the
177. See infra notes 178-216 and accompanying text.
178. 403 U.S. 388 (ig7i).
179. See 28 U.S.C. §1331 (2oo6).
18o. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.
r8i. Id. at 429 (Black, 3., dissenting).
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violation by federal agents of his Fourth Amendment rights, is entitled to
redress his injury through a particular remedial mechanism normally
available in the federal courts."' 82 Justice Brennan answers this question
"yes," but he does not offer much in the way of an explanation of why he
arrived at that answer.
Justice Brennan's answer to the question of rights and remedies is
the correct one-indeed, if structural rights are to be effectively
enforced, it is the only possible answer-but the explanation for that
answer is much more involved than Justice Brennan admits. The basic
framework of an explanation can be found in Justice Harlan's concurring
opinion in Bivens. Justice Harlan, who notes that he was initially
skeptical of the plaintiffs' claims, eventually concludes that the plaintiffs
were correct in asking the federal court to award damages for the Fourth
Amendment violations of federal agents.'8 ' He rests his conclusion on
two bases. First, Justice Harlan argues that the award of damages is
analogous to the traditional assumption that federal courts have inherent
authority under the general grant of subject matter jurisdiction to issue
equitable relief in cases falling within their jurisdiction.'" Second, Justice
Harlan argues that the award of damages for constitutional violations is
consistent with various precedents involving damages awards issued by
federal courts in cases involving statutory violations, in which the statutes
did not provide for specific remedial authority but damafes awards were
deemed necessary to effectuate the congressional policy.'" Justice Harlan
uses these two different areas of federal court procedure both to
emphasize that there is nothing new about federal courts utilizing
different types of traditional legal and equitable remedies to effectuate
their judgments, and to rebut the Bivens dissenters' claims that there is
something inherently legislative in nature about the authorization of
judicial remedies. Claims of this sort-that the authorization of judicial
remedies is an inherently legislative function-are particularly pertinent
to the enforcement of structural rights. Since one of the most important
functions of structural rights is to limit the excesses of both the legislative
and executive branches, it would be somewhat ironic if one of those
branches could thwart the enforcement of structural rights simply by
refusing to grant the courts remedial authority to enforce those rights.
The claim that the authorization of judicial remedies is exclusively a
legislative function is an explicit claim about the separation of powers.
More particularly, as Justice Harlan's Bivens concurrence makes clear,
this amounts to the claim that the creation of judicial remedies for
constitutional violations is a political question, which for both pragmatic
182. Id. at 397 (majority opinion).
183. Id. at 398 (Harlan, J., concurring).
184. Id. at 404-06.
185. Id. at 402-o3.
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and theoretical reasons the courts should not endeavor to address.'t If
phrased in this way, the flaw in the argument against the judicial creation
of remedies for constitutional violations becomes clear. In discussing this
argument, Justice Harlan refers to one of the classic descriptions of a
political question and concludes that the argument "cannot rest on the
notion that the decision to grant compensatory relief involves a
resolution of policy considerations not susceptible of judicial
discernment."" He then refers to a series of decisions in which courts
have enforced statutory rights in the absence of specific statutory
authorization of remedies.'m In these cases-the most important of which
is J. L Case Co. v. Borak'"-the Court inferred a damages remedy in
order to effectuate the purposes of the statute: "it is the duty of the
courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make
effective the congressional purpose."9l

The Court's decision in Borak is very short, and there is almost no
theoretical discussion of the courts' power vis-a-vis Congress to define
remedies for the enforcement of particular statutes. The reason for the
Court's offhanded treatment of this issue may be that there simply does
not seem to be much of an argument for the courts to refrain from using
their inherent remedial authority when confronted with a violation of a
substantive statutory right. After all, if Congress went to the trouble to
pass a statute containing substantive provisions, then it is reasonable to
assume that Congress was not engaging in an empty gesture. Enforcing
Congress's own policy could hardly be construed as hostile to Congress.
Moreover, if Congress did intend to engage in purely symbolic action
when it passed a statute, then it would be very easy to put in that statute
a clause indicating that Congress intended to create no private right of
action to enforce the statute. Also, if the courts misconstrued a statute as
substantive rather than symbolic, it would be very easy for Congress to
correct the courts' mistake. Finally, as a theoretical matter, it is very
strange to argue that the vigorous judicial enforcement of a statute in any
way infringes upon Congress's legislative authority. After all, the stated

186. Id. at 400-02.

187. Id. at 402; see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (identifying six elements that are
typically found in political question cases). For discussion of the Court's use of Baker in another area
in which the Court is restricting the litigation of structural rights, see infra note 248. For a discussion of
the Court's attempt to define all efforts to litigate structural rights violations as political questions, see
infra notes 246-50 and accompanying text.
188. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 402-09 (Harlan, J., concurring).
189. 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) (inferring that the federal courts have authority to order rescission
and damages remedies to victims of violations of section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934).
I19o. Id.
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purpose of inferring remedies in Borak-style cases is "to make effective
the congressional purpose."' 9 '
Despite the seemingly clear logic in allowing courts to devise
remedies to enforce the policies that Congress wrote into law, during the
past few years the Supreme Court has been systematically chipping away
at Borak and casting doubt on the proposition that the courts may infer
from the existence of a statutory policy that Congress actually wants that
policy enforced.'92 Justice Scalia has used what the Court has said in these
statutory rights cases to cast doubt upon Bivens and the authority it
confers upon the courts to infer remedies in constitutional rights casesincluding cases dealing with structural rights.'"
Two recent decisions exemplify the current Supreme Court's efforts
to eradicate the judicial authority to infer remedies to enforce statutory
rights. In the first of these cases, Alexander v. Sandoval, the Supreme
Court refused to infer a remedy to allow private individuals to enforce
disparate-impact regulations under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.194 In the second of these cases, Gonzaga University v. Doe, the
Court held that there is no private right of action to enforce a statute that
Congress named the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of
1974.'" There is a certain irony in the Court holding that a statute whose
title includes the phrase "Family Educational Rights" in fact creates no
rights whatsoever. This irony would be allowed to pass without comment
here but for the fact that the methodology producing the irony is at the
heart of how the Court is revamping the area of inferred remedies for
statutory and constitutional violations. At the most obvious level what
the Court is doing in these cases is moving from a Borak-style search for
methods to effectuate policies passed by Congress, to a rigid, formalistic
system that is built upon the presumption that individuals may not
enforce their rights unless Congress explicitly grants them permission to
do so. The Court actually goes even further in Gonzaga, in which the
Court takes its new analysis requiring Congress to explicitly articulate
individual rights and applies that analysis to limit relief in cases in which
the plaintiff is attempting to enforce a statute by using 42 U.S.C. § 1983one of the broadest and most comprehensive remedial statutes Congress
has ever written.196
As with the Court's recent efforts to narrow the concept of standing
and its concurrent attempts to restrict the ability of plaintiffs to raise

191. Id.
192. See infra notes 194-216 and accompanying text.

193.
194.
195.
196.
284-86.

See infra note 208 and accompanying text.
532 U.S. 275, 293 (2oo1).
536 U.S. 273, 290 (2oo2).
For the discussion of the Court's application of its analysis to cases involving § 1983, see id. at
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facial challenges to unconstitutional statutes, the primary rationale for
the Court's refusal to infer remedies for the enforcement of statutory
rights is separation of powers, defined for present purposes as a general
inclination toward judicial passivity in deference to the political
branches. The Court even treats this approach as being inherent in the
very structure of the federal courts. Justice Scalia, speaking on behalf of
the majority in Sandoval, concludes that "[r]aising up causes of action
where a statute has not created them may be a proper function for
common-law courts, but not for federal tribunals."" Thus, the Court
creates a system in which Congress has to enact statutes in particular
forms. If Congress intends to create policies that benefit individuals and
have those policies enforced, Congress not only has to explicitly
articulate an individual right in the text of the statute, but also has to
separately articulate an equally explicit grant of remedial authority in
order to permit the courts to enforce that right.' 98 Congress's failure to
follow the Court's instructions about how to write statutes will result in
Congress having engaged in essentially an empty gesture. One of the
many ironies in these cases is the fact that the Court, acting in the name
of judicial deference to Congress, effectively dictates detailed
instructions to Congress regarding how it must do its work.
It should be emphasized that these cases represent a radical
departure from the way the Court had previously treated the issue of
enforcing ambiguous statutes. It should also be noted that these recent
cases have the effect of overruling Borak. Although the Court explicitly
refuses to follow Borak, it attempts to enlist support for this decision by
claiming that Borak effectively had been abandoned much earlier.
Specifically, Justice Scalia contends in Sandoval that the Court had
abandoned the Borak understanding of private causes of action twentysix years earlier in Cort v. Ash.'" In fact, this is demonstrably untrue.
Although in Cort a unanimous Court refused to infer a private cause of
action for damages from the existence of a federal criminal statute
prohibiting certain corporate election contributions, the Court also
reaffirmed Borak at several places in its opinion.2" Indeed, in Cort the
Court summed up its understanding of the rules pertaining to private
causes of action in a way that directly contradicts the standard adopted in
197. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 287 (quoting Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson,
501 U.S. 350,365 (199i) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).

198. Id. at 286 ("The judicial task is to interpret the statute Congress has passed to determine
whether it displays an intent to create not just a private right but also a private remedy.").
199. Id. at 293; see Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S.66, 78 (1975).
2oo. See, e.g., Cort, 422 U.S. at 79 & n.il (citing J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 433 (1964), in
support of the proposition that "provision of a criminal penalty does not necessarily preclude
implication of a private cause of action for damages"); id. at 84 (quoting central principle of Borak,
377 U.S. at 433, that it is the duty of courts to infer remedies that would effectuate congressional
intent).
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Justice Scalia's opinion in Sandoval nearly three decades later.
According to Cort, "in situations in which it is clear that federal law has
granted a class of persons certain rights, it is not necessary to show an
intention to create a private cause of action, although an explicit purpose
to deny such cause of action would be controlling. 2 0' Justice Scalia's
assertion that Cort abandoned Borak is also inconsistent with the portion
of the Cort opinion that identifies several factors for courts to use in
deciding whether to infer private rights of action to enforce statutes.o
This list includes some factors that would be embraced by Justice Scalia,
such as whether the statute that the party seeks to enforce creates a
federal right in favor of the plaintiff, and whether there is any implicit or
explicit indication of legislative intent to create a private remedy. 20 3 But
the Cort list also includes one factor that is based on the central holding
of Borak: "[I]s it consistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?" 2
In the end, the most important thing is not the fact that within the
last few years the Court has abandoned Borak and revamped the rules
governing implied remedies to enforce federal statutes in a way that
virtually eradicates all implied remedies. The most important fact is that
Borak and the "effectuate-the-law" standard that it embodies are also
the basis for the Bivens concept that courts can infer remedies to enforce
constitutional provisions, including those that can be categorized as
structural rights. This raises the question whether, if the Court is willing
to abandon the Borak standard for inferring remedies to enforce
statutory rights, it is also willing to abandon the Borak-based standard
for inferring remedies to enforce constitutional rights. On one hand,
some of the logic of Gonzaga and Sandoval does not apply in the context
of constitutional remedies. If the Court in Gonzaga and Sandoval is
simply reducing statutory remedies to an exercise of literalistic statutory
interpretation, then Bivens should survive the new cases intact. On the
other hand, the larger theme of Gonzaga and Sandoval concerns the
more comprehensive issues relating to the separation of powers. If
separation of powers is the central theme of Gonzaga and Sandoval, then
these cases have a direct bearing on the continued viability of Bivens and
the very concept of using implied remedies to redress constitutional
violations.
The corrosive effect that these statutory remedies cases have on the
continued viability of Bivens has not gone unnoticed within the Court. In
CorrectionalServices Corp. v. Malesko, the Court refused to apply Bivens
to a case in which a prisoner sued a private corporation operating a
0

Id.at 82.
Id. at 78.
203. Id.
204. Id.
201.

202.
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halfway house under contract with the federal government.20 In
explaining its decision not to apply Bivens to this case, the majority
spoke mainly in terms of pragmatics. Specifically, the majority argued
that Bivens was concerned primarily with deterring individual federal
officials rather than agencies or institutions, and was therefore
inappropriate for the particular claim raised in the case." Chief Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion referred to Sandoval only in passing, in a
single footnote." It was left to Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion
joined by Justice Thomas, to highlight the full implications of Sandoval
and the other statutory remedies cases for Bivens and inferred
constitutional remedies generally. According to Justice Scalia:
Bivens is a relic of the heady days in which this Court assumed
common-law powers to create causes of action-decreeing them to be
"implied" by the mere existence of a statutory or constitutional
prohibition. As the Court points out, we have abandoned that power to
invent "implications" in the statutory field. There is even greater
reason to abandon it in the constitutional field, since an "implication"
imagined in the Constitution can presumably not even be repudiated
by Congress."o

Thus, Justice Scalia uses a case in which the Court renounces its
authority to fashion remedies for statutes created by Congress as support
for the proposition that the Court cannot use its inherent authority to

enforce constitutional provisions that are intended to tie Congress's
hands. Then, to make matters worse, Justice Scalia explains that the
Court should not use its inherent authority to enforce constitutional
provisions that are designed to limit Congress's power because such
authority cannot be repudiated by Congress.

Such is the casuistry that has led the Court to the brink of denying
the judicial branch the authority to enforce the Constitution. This topsyturvy view of judicial authority services the goal of separation of powers
only if one omits the courts from the concept of "powers." In truth, the
federal courts have unique powers that allow them to serve an
important-and from the perspective of structural rights, essentialfunction in the constitutional framework defined by the separation of
powers.
The argument presented here in favor of recognizing the inherent
judicial authority to remedy violations of structural rights echoes to some
extent the endless debate over whether Article III imbues the federal
courts with inherent jurisdiction, or rather allows Congress to exercise
the power to strip jurisdiction from the federal courts in some or all

205. 534 U.S. 61, 63 (2oo).
206. Id. at 70-71.
207. Id. at 67 n-3.
208. Id. at 75 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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circumstances." The concept of structural rights has implications for the
Article III debate because structural rights theory requires Article III to
be interpreted in a way that provides the federal courts with a
mechanism to perform their constitutional role in enforcing structural
rights.
When reduced to its essence, the structural rights argument is that:
(i) in the spirit of Blackstone and Chief Justice Marshall, "where there is
a legal right, there is also a legal remedy, by suit or action at law,
whenever that right is invaded" 2 0-thus, structural rights are presumed
to carry with them inherent legal remedies; (2) it is in the nature of legal
remedies to eschew self-help and require an enforcing agent; and (3) the
federal courts are the only plausible entities that are equipped to enforce
the inherent remedies that attend structural rights. This argument
complements the position of those who assert that the concept of
separation of powers as embodied in Article III limits Congress's
authority to strip jurisdiction or to eliminate altogether the federal
courts."' The argument here is different than the usual Article III
argument, however, because the structural rights argument asserts that
the limitations on Congress's ability to restrict the remedial authority of
courts are a logical inference of the rights themselves, rather than an
ingredient of Article III's jurisdictional provisions."' Thus, the structural
rights argument comes closest to Professor Hart's concept that courts
possess certain "essential functions," which Congress may not take away
through jurisdictional or remedial restrictions." 3 The structural rights
argument actually goes some distance beyond Professor Hart, who
209. Compare Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An
Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 908, 920 (1984) (arguing that
Congress has plenary authority to allocate jurisdiction to the lower federal courts and appellate
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court), Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of the

FederalCourts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030, 1031, 1041 (1982) (same), and Herbert Wexler, The Court and

the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, loo5 (1965) (same), with Lawrence Gene Sager, The
Supreme Court, 1980 Term - Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress's Authority to Regulate
the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARv. L. REV. IT 25-27 (1981) (arguing that Article III
imposes limitations on Congress's ability to strip jurisdiction from lower courts or to eliminate lower
courts altogether), Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court
Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498, 532-33 (1974) (same), and Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress
to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1362, I36345
(1953) (arguing that Congress does not have the constitutional authority to strip jurisdiction from
federal courts, especially with regard to the courts' "essential functions").
210. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 23 (1765)).
211. See Eisenberg, supra note 209; Sager, supra note 209.
212. For a similar argument, see Lawrence Sager's discussion of the proposition that Congress's
authority under the Exceptions Clause of Article III is limited by other constitutional provisions that
ordinarily constrain Congress's behavior. See Sager, supra note 209, at 37-42.
213. Hart, supra note 209, at 1365 ("The measure [of a congressional jurisdiction-stripping
measure's constitutionality] is simply that the exceptions must not be such as will destroy the essential
role of the Supreme Court.."
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focused only on the Supreme Court rather than lower federal courts2 1 4
and who was willing to concede that Congress could channel jurisdiction
to the Supreme Court so long as it did not altogether eliminate all
avenues into the Court."s In contrast to Professor Hart's deference to
Congress on these matters, adequate enforcement of structural rights
would require that the constitutional protection of jurisdiction in the
lower federal courts be just as robust as the protection of the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction, and would also prohibit Congress from limiting
more effective remedies in favor of others that may be less effective.
Nevertheless, the rationale for structural rights theory is exactly the same
as Professor Hart's rationale for restricting Congress's power to limit the
jurisdiction of federal courts: because the contrary position is based in
the proposition "that the power to regulate jurisdiction is actually a
power to regulate rights."2 6
HI. THE INSUFFICIENT JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE ELIMINATION OF
STRUCTURAL RIGHTS
The previous Part provides several examples of mechanisms created
or greatly enhanced by the current Court to deny litigants the ability to
effectively enforce federal statutory and constitutional law. These efforts
to limit the courts' authority to enforce the law strike especially hard at
efforts to enforce structural rights. Indeed, the imposition of procedural
limitations on constitutional litigation will have the effect of diluting or
exterminating structural rights in many cases. It is not difficult to see why
this is so. Unlike personal rights, structural rights benefit all citizens to an
equal degree. Unfortunately, the benefit is highly abstract: the
preservation of a form of government that allows each citizen to
participate (or not) in government to the extent that citizen feels
comfortable. Thus, the party complaining in court about violations of
structural rights will often lack the sort of very specific and particularized
injuries more common in private tort litigation and now basically
required in all cases under the Court's strict standing doctrine."
Likewise, violations of structural rights will often be systemic rather than
particularized, and therefore will often require broad facial attacks on an
entire statutory framework or administrative scheme. Thus, the Court's
recent limitations on facial attacks will hit structural rights litigation

214. See id. at 1363-64 ("Congress seems to have plenary power to limit federal jurisdiction when
the consequence is merely to force proceedings to be brought, if at all, in a state court.").
215. See id. 1372-73 ("It's hard. .. to read into Article III any guarantee to a civil litigant of a
hearing in a federal constitutional court (outside the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court) if
Congress chooses to provide some alternative procedure.").
216. See id. at 1371.
217. See supra notes 73-122 and accompanying text.
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especially hard.2 18 Finally, as the Court advances toward the possible
elimination of Bivens, it could potentially construct a legal landscape in
which courts would be stripped of all powers to enforce constitutional
provisions intended to keep the elected branches of government within
their constitutional boundaries. 2 9" These effects are significant, and
arguably alter the very nature of the American constitutional landscape.
If the concept of structural rights set forth in Part I, supra, is correct, then
eliminating the courts' ability to enforce structural rights will centralize
power and to a large extent undercut the democratic nature of this
country's constitutional government.
Given the sinister implications of these moves toward restricting
structural rights litigation, what justifications could be offered for the
Court's recent actions? Courts and academic commentators have
provided several explanations for imposing the various procedural
limitations on constitutional litigation discussed in the previous Part, but
these explanations are almost always offered in a vacuum, without regard
to the specific substantive implications that those procedural limitations
may carry. It is therefore worth exploring these explanations in a broader
light. In this broader light, the question is not whether, as a matter of
institutional design, courts should systematically restrain themselves
from acting in particular cases, but rather whether the structural rights
provisions of the Constitution can serve their function if courts refuse to
perform their role of enforcing structural rights and thereby keeping the
democratic system functioning effectively. Or, to put the matter another
way, if the courts do not fulfill this structural function, then who or what
will?
Rather than ask questions about the systemic implications of their
restrictive approach to constitutional procedure on the constitutional
design, representatives of the current Court's majority tend to recite
vague constitutional platitudes to justify the limitations they are
imposing on constitutional litigation.220 These platitudes usually involve
some variation on the theme of separation of powers or judicial
restraint."' In contrast, the dissenters tend to focus more narrowly on the
pragmatic implications of imposing procedural limitations on
This gives the dissents in these cases a
constitutional litigation.'
grounded quality that the majority opinions lack, but focusing on
pragmatics makes it difficult for the dissents to respond adequately to
what the majority claims are basic constitutional principles.

218. See supra notes 125-76and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 178-216 and accompanying text.
220. See infra notes 229-33, 236-38 and accompanying text.
221. See infra notes 234-35 and accompanying text.
222. See infra notes 223-28 and accompanying text.
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Some of the clearest examples of the different approaches embraced
by the majority and dissenters can be found in recent standing decisions.
To the majority in these cases, the standing limitations are all about the
grand principle of the separation of powers, which is to say (depending
on how one looks at the matter) judicial restraint or judicial
powerlessness." To the majority, allowing courts to adjudicate what
have come to be known as "generalized grievances" would violate the
central theoretical division between the political branches and the
courts. 4 This theoretical division is that courts are allowed only to
adjudicate individual grievances, whereas the political branches are
allocated authority to protect the public interest writ large. As the
Court's majority phrased this point in Lujan, "Vindicating the public
interest (including the public interest in Government observance of the
Constitution and laws) is the function of Congress and the Chief
Executive."2
We will return in a moment to the obvious question of what
happens when Congress or the Chief Executive violates the public
interest as embodied in the Constitution and laws. For the moment,
however, it is noteworthy that the Court's majority has staked out a
definitive theoretical position on these issues. The majority's arguments
for limiting the courts' remedial power to adjudicate issues of
constitutional law are integral to a comprehensive political and
constitutional theory-that is, a theory of how a democratic government
should be structured. The majority's position produces what to a
layperson must sound like a very strange rule of law. As the majority
phrased that rule in Lujan: "an injury amounting only to the alleged
violation of a right to have the Government act in accordance with law
[is] not judicially cognizable."22 6 The Court's majority believes, at best, in
a formalist democracy, in which those who are formally elected to
control the political branches are essentially authorized to act unfettered
by laws or constitutional provisions that impede the implementation of
their immediate policy objectives-even if those objectives are inherently
undemocratic. The majority's implicit response to those who object to
the fox being allowed to guard the chicken coop in this fashion is that if
the objectors do not like the results, then they should convince their
fellow citizens to elect a better quality fox.

See infra notes 243-57 and accompanying text.
224. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 174 (1974) ("[A] taxpayer may not 'employ a
federal court as a forum in which to air his generalized grievances about the conduct of government or
the allocation of power in the Federal System."' (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 114 (1968)
(Stewart, J., concurring))).
225. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,576 (1992).
226. Id. at 575.
223.
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There are, of course, alternative conceptions of democracy, such as
the one proposed in this Article, but one could not easily find such a
conception in the dissenters' opinions in the Court's recent standing
cases. Instead, what we find in the dissenters' opinions are a series of
fairly narrow, pragmatic objections that rarely extend the dissenters'
more liberal notions of standing beyond the facts of the case at hand. In
Hein, for example, the dissenters argued that the standing issue reduces
ultimately to the pragmatic matter of whether the plaintiff's complaint is
too abstract to be justiciable by the courts.' Unfortunately, the dissent
then gives away much of the game by conceding that "once one strays
from these obvious cases [i.e., economic or physical harms], the enquiry
can turn subtle."22 8 Instead of fighting standing battles by analogizing to
economic or physical harms -an analogy that will never work in favor of
those litigating constitutional violations or other public harms-it would
be more profitable for the dissenters in these cases to simply reject the
analogy to individual injuries altogether, and assert forthrightly that
there is a category of harm to the commonwealth in which the normal
standing rules simply should not apply. The dissenters should urge the
full Court to recognize that the government is capable of harming the
very fabric of democratic governance by ignoring constitutional
limitations on its actions. Since these constitutional limitations exist in
order to protect the essence of democracy-i.e., the citizens' power over
their government-then it stands to reason that every citizen has a vested
interest in asking the courts to correct these harms when they occur.
Discussions similar to those in the Court's standing decisions can
also be found in the Court's recent discussions of the permissibility of
facial challenges to unconstitutional statutes and, to a lesser extent, in the
cases discussing limitations on the judicial power to infer remedies for
constitutional violations. In the cases involving facial challenges, in fact,
the Court's justifications for the Salerno rule (or a rule that falls short of
Salerno but nevertheless strictly limits facial challenges to
unconstitutional statutes) could be lifted almost verbatim from its
standing decisions. Two themes figure prominently in these cases: one
theme relates to the separation of powers and the other relates to the
individualized nature of rights enforcement. Both themes have their

227. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 641-43 (Souter, J., dissenting).
This conception of standing harkens back to Flast v. Cohen, in which a then-liberal majority asserted
that the "'gist of the question of standing' is whether the party seeking relief has 'alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions."' 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204
(1962)).

228. Hein, 55x U.S. at 642 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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roots in attitudes expressed in cases that predate the present dispute over
Salerno.
The most comprehensive expression of these attitudes in preSalerno cases appears in Justice Black's majority opinion in Younger v.
Harris, which held that in most circumstances federal courts have no
authority to enjoin ongoing state criminal proceedings involving federal
constitutional challenges to state statutes.' According to Justice Black,
"Procedures for testing the constitutionality of a statute 'on its
face' . . . are fundamentally at odds with the function of the federal courts

in our constitutional plan." 30 The power of judicial review, Justice Black
continued, "does not amount to an unlimited power to survey the statute
books and pass judgment on laws before the courts are called upon to
enforce them."2 31 Justice Black gives several reasons to support judicial
restraint in the face of unconstitutional legislation, all of which relate to
the need for judicial deference to legislative prerogatives.
The combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the
impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the
speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis
of detailed statutes, ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly
unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way
they might be decided.232

Justice Black also couples the judicial restraint theme with the
theme that rights (at least judicially enforceable rights) are all individual
in nature.
The power and duty of the judiciary to declare laws unconstitutional is
in the final analysis derived from its responsibility for resolving
concrete disputes brought before the courts for decision; a statute
apparently governing a dispute cannot be applied by judges,
consistently with their obligations under the Supremacy Clause, when
such an application of the statute would conflict with the
Constitution.
Thus, Justice Black renders the federal courts' magisterial authority
to enforce constitutional limitations on political actors via the power of
judicial review as subservient to the haphazard and piecemeal judicial
processes more befitting a low-level state civil court.
The more recent cases involving facial versus as-applied challenges

have far less comprehensive discussions of the reasons why a majority of
the Court wants to limit facial challenges. Indeed, in cases like Bowen v.
229. 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971) (dismissing a lawsuit raising First Amendment claims against a
California statute that two years earlier the Court had suggested was unconstitutional); see id. at 6o
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court itself had deemed the statute at issue in Younger
unconstitutional only two years earlier).
230. Id. at 52 (majority opinion).
231. Id.
232.

Id. at 53 (citation omitted).

233. Id. at 52.
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Kendrick234 this issue is not addressed at all in the majority opinion that
rejects the facial challenge, leaving it to the dissent to point out several
practical problems with relegating the plaintiffs to as-applied
challenges.' United States v. Salerno236 lent its name to the so-called
"Salerno rule," which is the focal point of the current dispute over the
viability of facial challenges to unconstitutional statutes, but that opinion
is equally bereft of any systematic discussion of why facial challenges
should be limited. In Ayotte, one of the most recent examples in which
the Court refuses to facially invalidate an unconstitutional law, the Court
includes a very general discussion of "[t]hree interrelated principles
[that] inform our approach to remedies."" All three principles are
simply paeans to the grail of judicial deference to legislative action.23'The
Court's brief discussion of these principles, however, tells us little about
why such deference is either necessary or advisable in the particular
circumstances presented in Ayotte or any other case.
A similar pattern appears in the cases discussing restrictions on
inferred remedies for constitutional violations. The pattern starts in
decisions such as Sandoval and Gonzaga-cases in which the Court
limited judicial authority to infer remedies from the substantive
provisions of statutes. In these cases the Court limited judicial authority
ostensibly in the interest of judicial restraint and deference to the
political branches.' But as noted above, the actual effect of these
decisions is to refuse to enforce valid statutes unless the statutes contain
specific remedial provisions as demanded by the Court. The Court's logic
that this amounts to deference to the political branches makes sense only
in the context of a severe and literalistic textualism. The Court evidently
believes that Congress passes statutes that it never intends to have
enforced, and communicates the message that it does not want a statute
enforced by neglecting to include a remedial provision. Somehow in
these cases the contrary assumption-that Congress always wants its
statutes enforced unless it says otherwise-is viewed as insufficiently
deferential to the political branches. Since this theme of judicial restraint

234. 487 U.S. 589 (1q88).
235. See id. at 627 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority misused the distinction
between facial and as-applied challenges in order to "divide and conquer appellees' challenge.... By
characterizing appellee's objections to the real-world operation of the [statute] as an 'as-applied'
challenge, the Court risks misdirecting the litigants and the lower courts toward piecemeal litigation
continuing indefinitely throughout the life of the [statute].").
236. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
237. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006).

238. The Court's three principles are more akin to three mandates to courts crafting judicial
remedies: First, avoid nullifying more of a statute than is necessary; second, do not rewrite statutes in
order to salvage them in the face of legal attacks; and third, respect legislative intent, "the touchstone
for any decision about remedy."' Id. at 329-30.
239. See supra notes 194-21.
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and deference to Congress is used to deny enforcement of valid
congressional statutes, it makes little sense even in the statutory context.
Nevertheless, members of the majority such as Justice Scalia have
already taken this theme and applied it directly to cases such as Bivens,
in which the Court infers remedies to enforce constitutional provisions
that are specifically designed to limit Congress's power.240 Justice Scalia
even suggests at one point that one reason why courts should not be
allowed to infer remedies to enforce constitutional rights is because it
would deny Congress the authority to repudiate those remedies.24'
Conversely, it is the premise of this Article that repudiating remedies is
the equivalent of repudiating the substantive rights to which those
remedies attach. If this is true, then Justice Scalia must explain why in the
context of structural rights, if Congress has no authority to repudiate the
rights themselves, it somehow has acquired the authority to eradicate the
remedies that give those rights substance.
In sum, the Court's explanation for its behavior is remarkably
similar in all the recent cases in which it seeks to deny access to judicial
remedies for violations of structural rights. To the extent that the Court
discusses its rationale for limiting judicial authority to enforce rights,
including structural rights, that rationale almost always boils down to
some variation on the theme of judicial restraint and an enforced respect
for the elected branches of government.24 2 The current majority of the
Court considers judicial restraint an unequivocal social and political
good, but in fact, at least in the context of structural rights, judicial
restraint has the effect of distorting the constitutional system by
eradicating structural constraints on the action of the political branches.
Thus, in this context the term "judicial restraint" is something of a
misnomer. In this context, judicial restraint has exactly the same type of
effect as the absence of judicial restraint. By refusing to prohibit actions
that violate structural constraints on the government, the Court
effectively certifies those actions as legitimate. Whether the courts act or
refuse to act, meaning is ascribed to the Constitution and political power
is deployed in particular ways.
Although judicial restraint is usually posited as a laudable exercise
of judicial humility, in fact it is often just the opposite. In a situation in
which a structural constraint is asserted against some government action,
the courts have only two options. Under option one, the courts may use
their power to enforce the structural constraint, which will have the
effect of enforcing the constitutional provision and thereby preventing
the government from acting illegally. Under option two, the courts may

240. See supra noteS 206-i6.
241. See infra note 246.
242. See supra notes 194-238 and accompanying text.
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assert some version of the theory of judicial restraint, which will have the
effect of refusing to enforce the constitutional provision and thereby
allowing the government to act illegally. Paradoxically, in this scenario
judicial restraint is actually the less humble position for the courts to
take. When the courts defer to the unconstitutional exercise of power by
the political branches, they do not modestly yield to the greater expertise
or judgment of other branches of government; rather, the courts become
the handmaidens and facilitators of rogue political actors.
The Court's approach of dispensing with many constitutional issues
involving structural rights by referring to the principle of judicial
restraint has the effect of turning these issues into political questions.
The Court has on at least one occasion admitted this forthrightly. In
United States v. Richardson, the Court rejected on standing grounds a
challenge to Congress's refusal to publish the CIA's secret black
budget.243 The plaintiff's claim was that this refusal violated the
Constitution's Statement and Account Clause," which requires that "a
regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all
public money shall be published from time to time."245 The Court noted
that the plaintiff shared his injury with every other citizen." 6 In
explaining why this fact is relevant to its decision to dismiss the
complaint on standing grounds, the Court explicitly referred to the
political question doctrine:
It can be argued that if respondent is not permitted to litigate this
issue, no one can do so. In a very real sense, the absence of any
particular individual or class to litigate these claims gives support to the
argument that the subject matter is committed to the surveillance of
Congress, and ultimately to the political process.... Lack of standing
within the narrow confines of Art. III jurisdiction does not impair the
right to assert his views in the political forum or at the polls. Slow,
cumbersome, and unresponsive though the traditional electoral process
may be thought at times, our system provides for changing members of

the political branches when dissatisfied citizens convince a sufficient

number of their fellow electors that elected representatives are
delinquent in performing duties committed to them.24
There are several problems with the Court's explanation, starting with

the fact that the claim in Richardson fits none of the six classic features of
political question claims set forth in Baker v. Carr248-a case to which the
court in Richardson specifically refers. 249

243. 418 U.S. 166, 179-80 (1974).

244. Id. at 167.
245. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
246. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 178.
247. Id. at 179.

248. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (identifying six elements that are typically found in political question
cases). The six major factors do not apply to the issues in cases such as Richardson because there is no
textual constitutional commitment of the relevant issues to another branch of government: there are
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The bigger problems, however, are with the Court's reference to the
democratic process as a solution to the plaintiffs complaint about
Congress's constitutional violation. The most basic problem is one of
logic. The plaintiff in Richardson essentially brought an informational
claim. In other words, he claimed that the Constitution guaranteed
citizens certain information in order to allow them to exercise their
democratic franchise knowledgeably. The Court rejected his claim, and
referred those who seek this information to the democratic process,
inviting them to convince "a sufficient number of their fellow electors" to
throw the scoundrels out if Congress did not produce the requested
information.2 0 Unfortunately, without the information that the plaintiff
sought in the lawsuit, there would be no way to convince his fellow
electors that bad deeds were afoot and there were scoundrels to be
thrown out.
The larger problem is with the Court's snapshot view of democracy.
The Court's view of democracy is that of an electoral snapshot-a onetime, winner-take-all contest in which the winners are essentially
unconstrained in the exercise of their power once they get into office. If
people do not like the way elected officials exercise power, the argument
goes, then they can eject those officials from office at the next election.
The possibility that politicians may exercise their power after their first
election in ways that perpetuate that power indefinitely does not seem to
have occurred to the Court. Nor does it seem to have occurred to the
Court that political factions on both sides of the aisle may have a joint
interest in advancing the unfettered exercise of governmental power,
since both Democrats and Republicans will have little desire to diminish
the power that comes with the crown that they both seek to wear.
The unconstrained, vulgar democracy contemplated by the Court
may have many virtues, but it has many more flaws. Most of those flaws
have to do with the political consequences noted in the previous
paragraph that attend the short-term thinking that the Court displayed in
Richardson. The structural rights in the Constitution described in Part I,
supra, are designed to mitigate these flaws by treating every political
faction that happens to gain power as beholden to the larger purposes of
the constitutional project. Under this system, the winner does not, in fact,
take all, because both the means and purposes of exercising power are
constrained by the need to preserve the democratic process itself. No
matter how large an electoral victory a particular faction has mustered,

manageable judicial standards for resolving the issues; the policies involved are not clearly intended
for nonjudicial discretion; the resolution of the issues do not express disrespect for coordinate
branches of government; there is no unusual need to adhere to an existing political decision; and there
is no potential for embarrassment due to multiple decisions by multiple departments.
249. See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 171, 173, 178, 18o.
250. Id at 179-
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that faction will be viewed as governing undemocratically whenever it
exercises power ina way that contravenes the rules that structure the
democratic process set forth in the Constitution. Contrary to the Court's
conception in Richardson, elections are only one part of the democratic
process. True democracy requires structural elements in addition to
elections to preserve the basic sense that citizens control the government,
which is the very essence of democracy in any of its forms.
Whenever the Court systematically seeks to limit access to judicial
relief, or limits the tools by which courts can provide that relief, the
Court thereby removes from the democratic process the very structural
elements that are necessary to render the system truly democratic. In the
various decisions discussed above-involving standing, limitations on
facial challenges to constitutional statutes, and limitations on judicial
remedies-this is precisely what the current majority on the Supreme
Court has done. In the standing area, the Court has reduced all
constitutional claims to the functional equivalents of everyday civil tort
suits, thereby making it impossible to enforce any structural rights claims
and thereby nullifying several structural rights provisions."' With regard
to recent limitations that the Court has placed on facial challenges, the
Court has effectively reduced challenges brought against broad
constitutional violations to the level of small-scale, fact-specific claims,
which must be brought in a piecemeal fashion that is often inefficient and
ineffectual. Finally, with regard to limitations on the courts' ability to
infer remedies to enforce constitutional provisions, the trajectory of the
Supreme Court's recent decisions seems to be predicated on the
assumption that certain constitutional provisions should exist only in the
abstract, and have no practical significance in the real world.
When all is said and done, the Court's reliance on judicial restraint
and deference to the legislature to justify its decisions limiting judicial
power rests on a claim about democracy. The claim is that society prefers
to be ruled by elected officials rather than, to borrow Raoul Berger's
famous book title, government by judiciary."' At first glance it may seem
that there is something to this claim; at first it may seem like judicial
deference represents a perfectly proper nod of respect to the democratic
process. In fact, if the form of democracy created by the Constitution is
properly understood, the Court's approach should be seen as thoroughly

251. Indeed, this is exactly what the Court has already done with the Statement and Account
Clause and the Incompatibility Clause. See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179-80 (Statement and Account
Clause); Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 2o8, 209 (1974) (rejecting the standing of
military reservists to challenge violations of the Incompatibility Clause by members of Congress who
simultaneously serve as members of the military).
252. See BERGER, supra note 12 (arguing that the Warren Court exceeded its authority and
extended the Court's reach into too many areas of policy by interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment
too broadly).
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of the
anti-democratic. By precluding effective enforcement
allows
short-term
the
Court
Constitution's structural rights provisions,
political victors to convert their electoral victory into the long-term
capture of power. This can occur in various ways, such as Gust to cite a
few examples that have actually been litigated in the Supreme Court) the
surveillance of political dissenters,'53 the unconstitutional arrest of
political dissenters,254 the misuse of police power,"' the operation of a
judicial system tainted by discrimination and prejudice,'_6 or the conduct
of basic governmental operations in unconstitutional secrecy.2 7 If no one
is allowed to go to court to challenge these violations, or if courts are not
allowed the remedial authority to redress them, then those controlling
the elected branches of government are effectively ceded the authority to
use the apparatus of government to perpetuate their own power, in ways
that fundamentally undermine the democratic premises of the
Constitution.
In light of the abuses that are possible under the Court's preferred
system, which would grant unfettered, unstructured primacy to the
elected branches of government, the Court's overtures to democracy
ultimately ring hollow. Despite the Court's repeated paeans to judicial
restraint and democratic governance, allowing democratically elected
governments to systematically undermine democratic safeguards does
nothing to foster democracy.
CONCLUSION

The proposition that all rights must have remedies is almost as old
as the Constitution itself. The current Supreme Court is whittling away at
that proposition by diluting judicial power to enforce rights at all stages
of litigation. While this is problematic in the area of personal rights, it is
especially problematic-indeed, probably fatal-to the entire concept of
structural rights. It is the premise of this Article that any government
that calls itself democratic must be framed around a series of structural
253. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, x5 (1972) (denying standing to plaintiffs challenging the
United States Army's surveillance and collection of information on domestic political protesters).
254. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 4-42 (197) (refusing to block the prosecution of a leftwing political activist under the unconstitutional California Criminal Syndicalism Act); see also supra
note 229 and accompanying text.
255. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983) (denying standing to plaintiff
seeking an injunction against the unconstitutional use of a chokehold by Los Angeles Police
Department); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 364-66 (1976) (denying standing to plaintiffs seeking to
bring a class action against the Philadelphia Police Department to challenge a pervasive pattern of
police misconduct directed toward minority citizens of Philadelphia).
256. See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493-96 (1974) (denying standing to plaintiffs
challenging a county's pattern of racially-discriminatory behavior in bond setting, sentencing, and the
assessing of jury fees).
257. See United States v. Richardson, 48 U.S. 166, 179-80 (1974) (denying standing to plaintiffs
seeking to challenge congressional violations of the Statement and Account Clause).
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rights, that is, rights possessed by all citizens that limit the extent to
which the current government can suppress opposition, accumulate the
means by which to control or manipulate the citizenry, and thereby allow
one or a few factions to maintain power perpetually. The current trend
toward limiting the courts' power to enforce structural rights undercuts
the democratic bona fides of any government operating under such a
truncated constitutional regime. The only response to this claim offered
by advocates of the current trend toward limiting judicial power to
enforce structural rights is that the courts should defer to the political
agencies of government whenever possible. As noted above, this
argument misconstrues the concept of democracy and effectively places
the foxes in charge of the henhouse. Without the constraints on those in
power offered by an independent judiciary armed with the broad
authority to adjudicate and remedy violations, the structural rights that
are a necessary ingredient of any democratic constitutionalism become
empty, meaningless shells. "Rights" of this sort are more in keeping with
the structure of the old Soviet Constitution than the current American
one.
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